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Editorial
The most serious crisis to affect the international 
financial system since 1929 is unfolding before 
our eyes as this edition of the Quarterly Report 
of the Euro Area goes to print. Banks have lost 
confidence and all but stopped lending to each 
other. The decline in confidence has driven once 
renowned financial institutions in both the US 
and in Europe into bankruptcy. Since the crisis 
erupted in August 2007, the international 
financial system has been in the throes of a 
profound transformation – a process which has 
accelerated dramatically in recent weeks. 
International banking today looks quite different 
than it did just a few weeks ago. And we still do 
not have a clear idea of what it will look like 
tomorrow.  
The economic authorities in the US, where the 
first signs of crisis emerged more than a year ago, 
have adopted an unprecedented rescue package 
for the ailing banking sector ('troubled asset relief 
programme' or TARP). Its objective is to remove 
illiquid “toxic” assets from banks' balance sheets 
with a view to restoring confidence in the 
financial sector, re-focusing markets on 
fundamentals and preventing the market from 
grinding to a standstill. In the euro area the 
situation initially appeared less acute. But 
European banks are not immune from the 
fallout, and national governments on this side of 
the Atlantic have had to come to the rescue of 
failing banks here too.  
The financial market crisis is hurting the real 
economy. Risk premia are up, asset prices are 
falling and credit conditions are deteriorating as 
financial deleveraging works its way through the 
economy. Business and consumer confidence has 
declined markedly and activity has begun to 
weaken. The impact of the financial market 
corrections has been compounded by the 
inflationary pressure from high oil and 
commodity prices as well as by the severe 
housing market downturns in some Member 
States. Even though housing wealth and 
collateral effects play a less important role in 
most euro-area Member States than in the US, 
this report argues that the rapid accumulation of 
mortgage debt in recent years is likely to continue 
to put a damper on private consumption in the 
euro area for some time as households repair 
their balance sheets.  
Overall, we expect economic activity to remain 
flat in the second half of 2008, with the risks to 
the growth outlook clearly tilted to the downside 
as we go forward into 2009. If there are no 
further adverse shocks we expect inflation to 
come down on the back of slowing demand. 
While there remain  risks of second-round effects 
and wage settlements in conflict with current 
productivity growth prospects, their likelihood is 
receding given the weakness of economic 
activity. Moreover, the terms-of-trade losses 
experienced this year will also have an impact on 
both actual and potential growth. The higher 
energy costs and financing will make certain 
portions of our capital stock obsolete and 
thereby reduce the productive capacity of our 
economy.  
What are the right policy responses in these 
challenging times? The key economic policy 
objective must be to help restore confidence 
through reliable, consistent and effective 
economic policies that are well coordinated at the 
European level. The euro and EMU's policy 
framework provide the means for the right policy 
response to the financial crisis. For instance, the 
very effective liquidity response by the ECB 
would have been impossible with 15 separate 
national monetary authorities. However, the 
ongoing turmoil has also revealed important 
weaknesses in the European financial market 
system as it exists today. The roadmap of 
regulatory actions adopted by the Ecofin Council 
in October 2007 contains essential elements for 
reform, and good progress is being made to 
make our system more resilient in case of future 
turmoil.  
However, with the global financial system in such 
upheaval, swifter action is needed to restore 
stability and confidence in our financial markets. 
On 6 October, the EU Heads of State and 
Government committed in a joint statement to 
take whatever measures are necessary to maintain 
financial stability and acknowledged the need for 
close coordination and cooperation. While public 
intervention will be decided at national level, 
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Ecofin Ministers, building on the declaration of 
their Heads, agreed to common principles to 
guide their action. In particular, interventions 
should be timely and temporary; mindful of 
taxpayers' interests; existing shareholders should 
bear the consequences of the intervention and  
government should bring about a change of 
management if necessary; the management 
should not retain undue benefits – governments 
may have inter alia the power to intervene in 
remuneration; legitimate interest of competitors 
must be protected, in particular through the state 
aids rules; and negative spillover effects should 
be avoided. 
The latest events in financial markets have made 
it clear that furthermore financial supervision – 
today still largely fragmented along national 
boundaries – needs to be brought into step with 
the reality of European integrated markets.  
Regarding our macroeconomic response, we 
have learned the lessons from the 1970s and 80s, 
when inappropriate policy and wage responses to 
oil price shocks led to a long period of difficult 
economic adjustment characterised by slow 
growth, mass unemployment, and rising debt and 
inflation. Curbing inflation and restoring 
purchasing power must be the key elements of a 
common strategy for the euro area. Fiscal 
balances will come under pressure in the coming 
months as revenues fall due to weaker levels of 
economic activity and expenditure rises in line 
with greater calls on government support and 
insurance programmes. In the face of these 
pressures, it is important that Member States 
make every effort to ensure compliance with the 
reformed Stability and Growth Pact, which calls 
for sustainable fiscal positions to be reached and 
maintained, providing sufficient flexibility to 
respond to deteriorating economic activity in an 
orderly and coordinated manner to the 
extraordinary juncture. This will support 
economic confidence and foster an environment 
of sustainable growth.  
European governments should also step up their 
dialogues with social partners to ensure that wage 
developments are in line with productivity and 
competitiveness. Together with a medium-term, 
stability-oriented monetary policy, this approach 
will help to anchor expectations and contribute 
to the objective of price stability.  
Structural reforms have a specific importance in 
the current economic context of inflationary 
pressures against a backdrop of important 
external shocks. We need to avoid the danger of 
'short-termism' in our response to today's 
economic woes. The Lisbon strategy provides 
the right framework for Member States to step 
up their structural reform efforts, which will help 
them adapt to the current shocks. Coordinated 
reform efforts, focusing on priority areas, can 
maximise the potential benefits by creating a 
mutually reinforcing dynamic across the euro 
area. Finally, the transition to a low-carbon and 
energy-efficient economy is more urgent than 
ever so as to reduce oil dependency and shield 
our economies from strong swings in energy 
prices. This strategy is fully in line with the co-
ordinated EU response to the economic 
slowdown adopted by the Ecofin Council of 7 
October. The unfolding slowdown in activity and 
the scale of the bail-out of the financial sector in 
some countries is again bringing fairness 
considerations to the fore. In many advanced 
economies we have observed rising income or 
wealth inequalities over the past two decades. 
The focus section of this report contributes to 
the debate by reviewing trends in income 
distribution in the euro area and by discussing 
their likely causes. It highlights the complexity of 
the interplay of the various factors influencing 
income inequality in euro-area Member States, 
which include not just global factors but also 
labour market institutions and redistribution 
policies. Solutions to rising income inequalities 
are not easy to devise. Successful strategies – of 
the 'flexicurity' type – require carefully designed 
labour market institutions and tax and benefit 
systems to minimise the market distortions and 
disincentive effects that are detrimental to 
growth while providing protection to the most 
vulnerable. Such strategies ensure that short-term 
needs are addressed without jeopardising longer-
term objectives. 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Activity in the euro area has weakened notably with output contracting by 0.2% q-o-q in the second quarter. The financial 
turmoil, high commodity prices and significant housing market corrections in some euro-area countries are taking their toll on 
consumer and business confidence. Private consumption dropped modestly in the second quarter while capital formation 
registered a significant contraction (-1.2% q-o-q) suggesting that the investment slowdown is no longer restricted to the housing 
sector but is spreading to the corporate sector. Although oil and food prices and the external value of the euro have recently 
eased, leading indicators suggest that the euro area has entered the second half of the year with weak momentum. The 
Commission’s September 2008 interim forecast projects a flat second half of 2008 for the euro area with average growth for 
2008 as a whole slowing down to 1.3%, a 0.4 pp downward revision compared to the 2008 spring forecast. However, the 
economic situation remains characterised by an unusually high level of uncertainty, particularly regarding the extent and the 
effects of the financial turmoil. Conditions in the international financial system have deteriorated significantly since the 
summer and the financial crisis is now the most serious since 1929. Despite large government intervention in the US and 
Europe, the extent, duration and impact of financial turbulence on the euro-area economy remains difficult to gauge.  
Part of the uncertainty surrounding the growth outlook in the euro area relates to the resilience of private consumption in a 
context of weak house price dynamics. Analysis presented in this report indicates that the sluggishness of consumption in the 
latest cycle can, in part, be explained by a change in savings behaviour which, in turn, can be related to adverse financial 
wealth effects. Risks attached to house prices appear low as housing wealth and collateral effects do not seem to play an 
important role in most euro-area countries. However, there is some evidence that households' rapid accumulation of mortgage 
debt over the past decade has been associated with some overshooting of the debt level. The consequent adjustment has curbed 
household spending, which probably somewhat dampened consumption in the past two years and will likely continue to do so 
in the short-term future.  
Repeated episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the euro area have been an issue of debate. As argued in this report, a close 
examination of the data shows that at least some of these episodes should be interpreted with caution. Compared to the US, 
the track record of fiscal stabilisation in the euro area improves when, in addition to discretionary measures, automatic 
stabilisers are taken into account. Moreover, in several instances pro-cyclicality was not a deliberate part of fiscal plans. It 
rather resulted from an over-optimistic appraisal of medium-term growth prospects, an incorrect judgement of the prevailing 
cyclical conditions and, in turn a fiscal stance, which with the benefit of hindsight turned out to have been unwarranted. 
Nevertheless, in some cases spending of revenue windfalls exacerbated the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. These findings call for 
progress in two areas: stronger national budgetary institutions to prevent use of revenue windfalls and more cautious 
macroeconomic forecasts to reduce the risk of pro-cyclical policies in good times. 
One factor behind the resilience of euro-area exports to the appreciation of the euro over the past few years is the increasing 
use, by euro-area exporters, of hedging strategies against exchange rate variations. While this practice is empirically well 
documented for the US and some individual European countries, little is so far known about hedging from a euro-area 
perspective. In order to shed some light on the hedging strategies and financial instruments used, this report presents a survey of 
self-reported hedging strategies of euro-area blue chip companies. It shows that euro-area exporters make ample use of 
instruments to protect themselves from exchange rate variations. This has probably contributed to the simultaneous strength of 
euro-area exports and corporate profits in the episode of euro appreciation. However, the effectiveness of currency hedges wears 
off over the phase of appreciation, and it is likely that trade flows will continue their adjustment to past euro appreciation. 
 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Economic situation worsens in the second 
quarter as the effect of global headwinds 
intensifies 
Output contracted in the euro area by 0.2% (q-o-
q) in the second quarter. This was the first 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 30 September 2008. 
contraction since the inception of the monetary 
union and indeed since the early 1990s. The drop 
in output in the second quarter is explained by 
three main factors: 
First, the euro area and the global economy 
continued to suffer from the financial market 
crisis with, for example, risk premia increasing 
and stock prices falling.  
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Second, the surge in inflation put a brake on 
private consumption. Soaring energy and food 
prices pushed up HICP inflation to 3.6% in the 
second quarter, which is higher than the 3.4% 
projected in the spring forecast.  
Third, a certain payback was expected after an 
unusually strong first quarter. During the first 
quarter euro-area GDP expanded by 0.7% q-o-q, 
which was both above market expectations and 
above the Commission's spring forecast of 0.5%. 
This growth surprise was partly explained by 
weather-related effects as the favourable winter 
weather boosted construction investment, adding 
about 0.1-0.2 to q-o-q GDP growth. Another 
factor was a sharp inventory accumulation, which 
reached a pace not seen since the peak of the 
previous cycle in late 2000.  
Nonetheless, the deceleration of activity in the 
euro area is genuine and not just a reflection of 
the short-term volatility of GDP data. Taking the 
last two quarters together, GDP expanded by 
0.2% q-o-q during the first half of the year, a 
sharp deceleration compared with the 0.5% 
registered during the previous half year.  
The disaggregation of GDP growth shows that 
the contribution of domestic demand (excluding 
inventories) weakened notably to 0.2% q-o-q in 
the second quarter, compared to 0.4% in the 
previous quarter (Graph 1). Net trade and change 
in inventories contributed only marginally to 
GDP growth. 
Graph 1: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q contributions in % points – 2006 Q3 to 2008 Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The global financial turmoil escalates further  
Conditions in the international financial system 
have deteriorated significantly since the summer 
and the financial crisis is now the most serious 
since 1929. There has been a need for 
unprecedented public intervention in the US 
financial system, but Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK had 
to commit public funds to support several banks 
at the end of September, while Ireland 
announced a deposit and debt guarantee of its 
key banks.  
Uncertainty remains about the extent, duration 
and impact of financial turbulence on the euro-
area economy. More than one year since the 
outbreak of the current financial turmoil, the 
situation in the international financial system 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 Carryover to 2008 
Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.6 0.4 0.7 -0.2 1.3 
Private consumption 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.4 
Government consumption 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.9 1.1 1.5 -1.2 1.9 
Exports of goods and services 1.8 0.4 1.8 -0.4 3.0 
Imports of goods and services 2.2 -0.4 1.9 -0.4 2.7 
Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 
Government consumption 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Changes in inventories 0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.0  0.1 
Net exports -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Source: Commission services. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 7 -  
continues to be fragile with several key credit 
markets still severely disrupted. There is no 
evidence of a recovery of investor confidence 
given the uncertainties about valuation, 
counterparty risks and the evolution of the 
deleveraging process. 
Conditions in the money markets are still 
abnormal. Spreads on interbank markets 
remained quite elevated in the second quarter 
and have since widened even further (Graph 2). 
Graph 2: Euro-area money market 
(in % - 1 Jan 2007 to 17 Sep 2008) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
The international banking sector continues to be 
at the heart of the turmoil and its problems 
remain acute, driven partly by developments in 
the financial sector itself and partly by the 
implications of a deteriorating economic 
environment. Banks are required to deleverage 
and repair existing damage to balance sheets in a 
context of constrained profitability, high funding 
costs and deteriorating credit quality among 
clients. Total losses and write-downs disclosed by 
banks worldwide have now exceeded 500 billion 
US dollars, but remain below estimates for 
overall losses across the financial system. In these 
conditions, banks are increasingly being forced to 
recapitalise, often at very high cost and in 
difficult market conditions.  
The implications of these developments in the 
global financial sector for monetary and financial 
conditions in the euro area are still unclear. On 
the one hand, bank lending standards have 
tightened markedly over the past year according 
to the September 2008 ECB's bank lending 
survey. The tightening of financial conditions is 
in any case not only confined to bank loans. 
Financial corporate bond spreads widened 
significantly across all rating classes in 2008. The 
persistently high spreads for the financial sector 
have also entailed an increase in bank funding 
costs, which is expected to have further 
repercussions for credit markets. Regarding the 
cost of equity capital, euro-area stock prices 
resumed their downward course in September, 
amid considerable volatility, and are now close to 
30% lower than a year ago.  
 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2007-2008 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8) 
Long-term average 100.6  0.0 85.4 52.8 55 96.8 -9.5 26.5 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.6 -0.92 98.1 46.6 47.7 90.3 -26.5 -41.6 
September 2007 106.3 1.07 107.4 53.2 54.2 98.7 1.4 -18.1 
October 2007 105.4 0.87 107.1 51.5 55.8 98.6 -1.8 -18.1 
November 2007 104.1 1.03 107.2 52.8 54.1 98.3 -0.5 -32.5 
December 2007 103.4 0.89 107.1 52.6 53.1 98.2 -1.8 -37.2 
January 2008 101.7 0.77 106.9 52.8 50.6 98.9 -0.8 -41.6 
February 2008 100.2 0.72 106.9 52.3 52.3 98.0 0.5 -39.5 
March 2008 99.6 0.79 106.5 52.0 51.6 98.3 1.1 -32.0 
April 2008 97.1 0.43 106.1 50.7 52.0 96.9 -7.4 -40.7 
May 2008 97.6 0.58 105.5 50.6 50.6 97.1 0.0 -41.4 
June 2008 94.8 0.14 104.7 49.2 49.1 94.5 -6.4 -52.4 
July 2008 89.5 -0.20 103.6 47.4 48.3 89.9 -8.1 -63.9 
August 2008 88.8 -0.28 106.5 47.6 48.5 87.0 -5.6 -55.5 
September 2008 87.7 -0.79  45.6 48.2 86.5  -41.1 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
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Graph 3: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
 (basis points, 1 Mar 2007 – 24 Sep 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
On the other hand, ECFIN'S Monetary 
Conditions Indicator (MCI) has loosened since 
the start of 2008 (Graph 3), as higher inflation 
and the development of the real exchange rate 
have more than offset the ECB's hike in interest 
rates. This has broken the tightening trend in the 
MCI observed until the end of 2007. 
Furthermore, banking rates have so far remained 
quite stable in the first half of 2008. 
Graph 3: Euro-area  MCI and its contributors 
 (Inverted scale Jan 1999 – August 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The extent to which deteriorating financial 
conditions have already affected the economy is 
difficult to assess. There has recently been a 
slowdown in lending to the private sector. 
However, the slowdown is mostly confined to 
households, with growth in bank lending for 
house purchases falling to its lowest levels on 
record since the start of these data series (1981). 
Whether this mostly reflects the demand effect 
of the ongoing downturn in the housing sector 
or a tightening of lending standards is difficult to 
say at this stage.  
Overall, the situation remains precarious. The 
interaction between accumulating losses in the 
financial system and a deteriorating global 
economic outlook make it very difficult to 
predict when the financial turmoil will end. 
Despite the recent easing, commodity prices 
remain a major reason of uncertainty 
In the second quarter, HICP inflation continued 
rising from 3.3% in April 2008 to slightly below 
4% in June. These high figures were driven by 
commodity prices, especially energy and food 
prices, which continued to surge substantially 
during this second quarter (Graph 5). The acute 
increase in the food component of the HICP 
reflects in particular the evolution of processed 
food while that of energy is clearly the result of 
the evolution of oil prices.  
Graph 5: HICP composition, euro area 
 (Jan 2006 – Aug 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Moving beyond the second quarter, headline 
euro-area inflation fell slightly to 3.8% in August 
and again to 3.6% in September (based on the 
Eurostat's flash estimate), having surged to a 
record high of 4.0% in July. The high July 
reading was largely due to the price of crude oil, 
which reached its highest level ever recorded in 
mid-July 2008 (the World ICE crude oil Index 
reached 145.5 USD on 14 July). Since the second 
half of July, oil prices have receded substantially 
and stood at 107 USD on 4 September, a decline 
of about 25% from the peak. However, despite 
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recent falls, the lagged effect of past oil price 
continues to exert upward pressure on energy 
inflation, although the contribution from energy 
declined significantly in August in comparison to 
July.  
Measures of core inflation continued to rise in 
August: headline inflation excluding energy and 
unprocessed food increased to 2.6% (+0.1 pp.) 
and the trimmed mean increased to 3.2%. 
Depending on how consumers react, the recent 
decline in headline inflation may be an 
encouraging sign for the growth outlook at the 
current juncture. Nonetheless, euro-area inflation 
is likely to remain elevated for longer than 
initially anticipated and should begin to show a 
significant deceleration only around the end of 
this year.  
A global slowdown is unfolding 
Euro-area exports contracted by 0.4% in the 
second quarter reflecting, in particular, the 
weakening of global demand and world trade. 
According to CPB statistics, world trade growth 
is now on a clear downward trajectory. In the 
second quarter – last available data – world trade 
registered its weakest q-o-q growth performance 
since the drop in world trade at the end of 2001.  
Graph 6: Growth developments in the US and Japan (q-
o-q % change, 2006Q3 – 2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The international economy expanded at a fast 
pace in 2007 and in the first quarter of 2008, but 
the momentum has now turned. Short-term 
indicators for most regions of the world point to 
a marked deceleration in the second half of 2008. 
Economic activity has already started to weaken 
in several advanced economies outside Europe, 
notably in Japan (Graph 6), although growth in 
Asia remains relatively robust. 
Despite the recent downturn, the US economy 
performed surprisingly well in the second quarter 
boosted by a sizable but temporary 
macroeconomic stimulus – worth about 1% of 
GDP – and by a weakening dollar. The tax rebate 
supported domestic demand, while the dollar 
depreciation helped exports. The stimulus has 
probably enabled the US to avoid a recession – at 
least temporarily – but at the cost of a swelling 
budget deficit. The economy now seems to be 
entering a contractionary phase as the effect of 
the fiscal stimulus is reversing and residential 
investment is continuing to contract steeply.  
Uncertainty and external conditions are 
weighing on confidence….  
Soaring commodity prices, the deepening 
financial turmoil and a housing shock in several 
euro-area countries are weighing on consumer 
and business confidence, and survey data paint a 
rather weak picture. Whilst there are differences 
across countries and sectors, the overall 
development points to a marked weakening of 
business and consumer sentiments. Survey 
indicators have deteriorated sharply since the 
spring. The Commission's overall Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESI) – which summarises 
developments in five sectors (industry, services, 
consumer, retail and construction) – continued to 
decline in August and September, to 87.7 in the 
euro area. The indicator has been below its long-
term average since March 2008. The Business 
Climate Indicator (BCI) for the euro area, which 
has been below its long-term average since July, 
registered its sharpest month-on-month drop 
since 2001 in September.  
The current weakness in business and consumer 
confidence partly reflects the persistent 
uncertainty on the short-term outlook for the 
euro area and the global economy. However, it 
also signals a genuine loss in the underlying 
momentum of the euro-area economy. While 
surveys show a marked deterioration of their 
forward looking components, the weakening in 
confidence is broad-based and households' and 
companies' assessments of the current situation 
are on a clear downward path as well.  
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Overall developments in confidence surveys 
signal that the marked deceleration in growth in 
the second quarter of 2008 was more than just a 
technical correction in response to the strong 
first quarter. They also suggest that the euro-area 
economy has entered the third quarter with a 
further loss in underlying momentum, 
particularly in the manufacturing sectors. Such an 
assessment is consistent with the disappointing 
reading of industrial production in July which 
showed a contraction in industrial activity by 
1.7% compared with a year before.  
…and domestic demand was a significant 
drag on economic activity in Q2 
Domestic demand was a significant drag on 
growth in the second quarter with investment in 
particular showing worrying signs of weakness 
(Graph 7). Capital formation, which had been a 
key driving force of the recovery in 2006-07, fell 
sharply in the second quarter, contracting by 
1.2% q-o-q. This can partly be explained by a 
setback in the construction sector after the 
weather-related strong reading of the first 
quarter, but also reflects subdued demand in 
corporate investment.  
Graph 7: Investment and loans to non-financial 
corporations, euro area 
(2006Q3 – 2008Q2, y-o-y changes in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Evidence of a loss in momentum in corporate 
investment is not restricted to national account 
data. Annual growth of loans to non-financial 
corporations decelerated to 13.2% in July 2008 
from 14.9% in April. The ECB's Bank Lending 
Survey also points to a significant deterioration 
of corporate loan demand for fixed investment in 
the past two quarters. Furthermore, capacity 
utilisation decreased by almost 1 pp between 
April and July 2008 in the euro area and 
industrial new orders have sent signs of a 
weakening since the spring. Finally, there is also 
some evidence of tensions on profit margins 
related to persistently sluggish growth in labour 
productivity. Based on national account data for 
real unit labour costs, enterprises seem to have 
shed much of the gains in profitability registered 
during the cyclical upswing in 2006 and 2005, 
with margins now back at their (admittedly high) 
early 2006 level.   
The weakening in corporate investment is adding 
to the ongoing downturn in the housing sector. 
The second quarter witnessed corrections in 
housing and construction markets in some 
Member States, notably in Ireland and 
particularly Spain where the contraction of the 
housing sector largely explains the recent sharp 
GDP slowdown. The downturn was also visible 
at the euro-area level with a 3% drop in real 
housing investment in Q2, a contraction which 
exceeds any possible weather-related effect and 
reflects genuine weakness.  
Private consumption in the euro area was also 
sluggish in the second quarter, contracting by 
0.2% (q-o-q) and pushing y-o-y growth down to 
a meagre 0.4% (Graph 8). Household spending 
decreased in Germany (for the third quarter in a 
row) and was very weak or flat in other large 
euro-area countries such as France and Spain. 
Consumers' confidence stabilised in August, after 
reaching (in July) its lowest value since early 
1994. Hard and soft data on retail trade now 
convey the same gloomy message of a continuing 
weakness in consumption. 
The poor performance of household 
consumption in the first half of the year reflects 
weak real incomes growth due to the sharp 
increase in oil and commodity prices and some 
moderation in the pace of job creation. Eurostat 
estimates show that the households savings ratio 
has remained broadly stable since the middle of 
last year. However, no estimate is currently 
available for the second quarter. In that quarter, 
the observed drop in consumption combined 
with a significant expansion in total real 
compensation (0.5% q-o-q) suggest that 
households may have eventually responded to 
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the persistent uncertainty in the global economy 
with a rise in their savings ratio.  
Graph 8: Private consumption and consumer 
confidence, euro area 
(2003Q3 – 2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The outlook for private consumption, the largest 
component of GDP, appears rather uncertain at 
this stage, not least in some Member States 
where corrections in housing markets appear to 
be moving faster than expected. As discussed in 
greater detail in Section 2 below, housing wealth 
effects are generally estimated to be small in the 
euro area and are therefore not a major source of 
concern in most Member States. However, the 
past housing booms have been associated with a 
surge in mortgage debt. There are indications 
that the level of debt may have somewhat 
overshot its fundamental value over the past two 
years in the euro area and that, in the past, the 
correction of overshooting periods was generally 
associated with some compression in 
consumption spending.  
 
Commission's interim forecasts point to a 
significant deceleration of growth in 2008 
The Commission’s September 2008 interim 
forecasts project a flat second half of 2008. For 
2008 as a whole, economic growth in the euro 
area is forecast to slow down to 1.3%. This 
represents a 0.4 pp downward revision compared 
with the 1.7% projected in the spring forecasts. 
The downward revision is relatively broad-based 
with significant revisions for Spain. The revisions 
mainly reflect the impact of the ongoing financial 
turmoil, the sharp slowdown in the US and high 
commodity prices. 
Inflation in 2008 is projected to average 3.6% in 
the euro area, an upward revision from the 3.1% 
projected in the spring forecast. Future markets 
predict that oil prices will remain high in 2008-
09, so energy HICP inflation will stay elevated in 
2008. However, with the impact of past increases 
in energy and food prices on the year-on-year 
rate of change in consumer prices declining in 
the coming months, inflation could be at a 
turning point. Future developments in 
commodity markets, as well as the capacity to 
contain second-round effects, will be key for the 
inflation outlook in the euro area. Uncertainty is 
still the dominant force in the economic situation 
and risks remain significant. Developments in 
commodity and financial markets will largely 
shape the growth outlook for the euro area and 
the global economy. 
 
Table 3: Real GDP growth  
(Interim forecast Sep. 2008) (1) 
 Quarterly GDP forecast (%, quarter-on-quarter)  
Annual GDP forecast 
(%, year-on-year) 2008 
 2008/1 2008/2 2008/3 2008/4 Spring forecast April 2008 
Interim 
forecast  
Sep. 2008 
Germany 1.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 1.8 1.8 
Spain 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 2.2 1.4 
France 0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.1 1.6 1.0 
Italy 0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Euro area 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.1 1.7 1.3 
(1) Where possible, the quarterly growth rates are working-day and seasonally-adjusted, whereas the annual projections are unadjusted. 
Source: Commission services . 
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2.  Household consumption: what are the 
risks attached to falling house prices 
and high debt?  
This section tries to shed some light on the 
reasons behind the disappointing growth in 
household consumption in recent years. Looking 
ahead, it also discusses the potential impact of 
increasing household debt and weakening house 
prices on the short-term outlook for consumer 
spending.  
Disappointing consumption growth…  
The euro-area economy has shown clear signs of 
improved resilience, at least when compared with 
the major downturns of the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, whereas investment and employment 
have been an important source of resilience 
during the latest cycle, consumption has 
remained disappointing.2 Between 2001 and 
2007, annual consumption growth averaged a 
moderate 1.5%, compared with 1.9% for GDP. 
The difference with GDP growth was even more 
striking during the latest recovery in 2006-2007 
when GDP expanded robustly at about 2.7% 
annually while private consumption growth 
remained subdued at 1.6%.  
Graph 9: Real disposable income after cyclical peaks, 
euro area  
(index 100 at cyclical peak)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Sluggish consumption growth largely reflects 
similar developments in disposable income. But a 
striking feature of the latest cycle has been the 
                                                     
2  For a more detailed analysis of economic resilience, see 
the Focus section of QREA, Vol. 6, N°3 (2007), 'The 
resilience of the euro-area economy'.  
relative resilience of disposable income, 
particularly during the early stages of the 
downturn (Graph 9). This development, which is 
sometimes overlooked when analysing 
consumption, can be explained by strong 
employment growth.  
… partly due to a change in saving 
behaviour… 
Part of the explanation for sluggish consumption 
growth in recent years is therefore related to 
unfavourable developments in the saving rate. 
Developments in the saving rate during the latest 
cycle clearly contrast with previous cycles, when 
households tended to offset adverse 
developments in disposable income by cutting 
their savings. During the latest cycle, households 
responded to the slowdown in activity in the 
early 2000s by raising their saving rate. More 
importantly, this more cautious behaviour 
coincided with a structural break in the savings 
ratio series (Graph 10). Whereas the savings ratio 
decreased steadily in the 1980s and 1990s – from 
about 25% of disposable income to less than 
14%, since 2002 it has stayed broadly stable. The 
impact of this change in saving behaviour has 
been significant, shaving more than 0.5 pp off 
annual consumption growth in the current 
decade.  
Graph 10: Household saving rate, euro area  
(in % of real disposable income – 1980Q1-2007Q4)  
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Source: Commission services and ECB. 
The downward trend in the saving rate during 
the 1980s and 1990s was observed in most euro-
area countries. However, its magnitude and 
dynamics varied across countries. For instance, 
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Italy's household saving rate began to fall 
substantially already in the 1980s while the 
decline in Germany only started in the 1990s and 
was much smaller (Graph 11).  
A clear break in the saving ratio in the early 
2000s, similar to that registered for the euro area 
as a whole, can be identified in the case of Italy, 
Germany and the Netherlands. In these 
countries, the downward trend was interrupted 
around that same year. In the case of Germany, 
the inflexion in the saving rate was even followed 
by an increase rather than a stabilisation. In 
France, however, the savings ratio has remained 
broadly stable since the start of the 1990s.3  
Graph 11: Household saving rate 
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Source: Commission services. 
…caused by changes in net financial wealth  
The break in the saving ratio has coincided with a 
parallel break in the upward trend of households' 
net financial wealth. Graph 12 shows a strong 
negative correlation between the two series (the 
scale for household net financial wealth is 
inverted in the graph). Real net financial wealth is 
here defined as financial assets minus financial 
liabilities, other than mortgages. The strong rise 
in household financial wealth in the 1980s and 
the 1990s was accompanied by a simultaneous 
sharp drop in the household saving rate. This 
seems to suggest that households have taken the 
increase in wealth caused by the long expansion 
in stock markets as a substitute for personal 
                                                     
3  Data for Austria, Greece, Spain and Portugal are only 
available since 1995, which is not sufficient to provide a 
long-term perspective. 
saving. The broad stagnation of financial asset 
values since the beginning of the 2000s seems to 
have triggered a stabilisation in the saving ratio.  
This analysis is confirmed econometrically by 
estimations which show a cointegrating 
relationship between the two variables at the 
euro-area level (Box 1). The long-run elasticity of 
the savings rate vis-à-vis financial wealth as a 
percentage of real disposable income is estimated 
at about -0.6%. Further analysis at Member State 
level would probably reveal cross-country 
differences.   
Graph 12: Household net real financial wealth and 
saving rate, euro area (in % of real disposable income)  
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Source: Commission services and ECB. 
Changes in house values are unlikely to have 
strong wealth effects on consumption…  
After a notable long-term rising trend since the 
mid-1990s, house prices started to moderate in 
the euro area in 2007Q1 and have even begun to 
drop in some Member States (Graph 13). 
Looking ahead, this raises the question of 
possible downside risks to private consumption 
related to unfavourable developments in housing 
markets.  
House price changes are considered to be 
potentially linked to consumption either through 
the wealth channels – which directly affect 
personal spending – or through the collateral 
channel – which affects consumption indirectly 
through households' borrowing constraints.  
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2008 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
Housing assets are different from financial assets 
as they also render services to the owners. As 
households are also consumers of housing 
services, capital gains from house-price increases 
tend to be partly or fully offset by the higher 
discounted value of future rents. Persistent long-
term net housing wealth effects are therefore not 
likely to be very strong on the aggregate at a 
country level.4 Housing wealth effects on 
consumption could result from wealth 
redistribution between renters and landlords with 
different marginal propensities to consume. But 
                                                     
4  Buiter, W. (2008), 'Housing wealth isn't wealth', NBER 
Working paper no 14204. 
the empirical evidence shows that these 
redistribution effects are weak.5 
 ….but can have transitory effects on 
consumption through the collateral channel 
Increases in the value of housing property 
improve credit-constrained households' position 
by increasing their collateral value. However, the 
effect on private consumption is heavily 
dependent on the level of mortgage market 
development and possibilities for mortgage re-
                                                     
5  Campbell, J. and J. Cocco (2005), 'How do house prices 
affect consumption? Evidence from micro data', Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 591-621, 
April. Attanasio, O., L., Blow, R. Hamilton and A. 
Leicester (2005), 'Consumption, House Prices, and 
Expectations', Bank of England Working Paper No. 271.  
Box 1: Household savings and net financial wealth 
According to the permanent income theory, households' savings decisions depend on their wealth rather than on 
disposable income alone. The estimated household savings function presented in this box is composed of two 
elements: a long-term and a short-term equation. The long-term equation relates the household saving ratio to 
selected long-term determinants. The short-term dynamics links changes in savings to a few variables and the lagged 
deviation of savings from its long-term value (the error correction term). The analysis is carried out for the period 
1980Q1-2007Q4 for the euro area.  
 
Net financial wealth as a percentage of gross disposable income comes out as the main determinant of the saving 
ratio in the long-term equation. In contrast, housing wealth was found to be non-significant. The estimated long-run 
elasticity is presented in the left-hand table below. In the long-run, a 1 pp increase in net financial wealth as a share 
of disposable income will lead to a decrease of 0.6 pp in the saving rate. The error-correction mechanism in the 
dynamic relationship has the expected negative sign. This means that when the saving rate deviates from its long-
term value, there is a reversion in the following quarter. However, the value of the estimate implies a relatively slow 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium (most of a deviation being eliminated after 2 years).  
Variable Elasticity estimated (2) Variable Elasticity estimated  
Savings/Yd 1.00 Error-correction term - 0.23*** 
Net financial wealth/Yd 0.63 
Change in net financial 
wealth/Yd (lagged by 1 quarter) -0.16* 
Constant 1.38 
Change in housing wealth/Yd  
(lagged by 1 quarter) 0.44** 
  
Change in unemployment rate  
(lagged by 1 quarter) -0.02** 
  Constant  -0.006*** 
The estimated parameters in the short-term dynamics are displayed in the right-hand table. Changes in net financial 
wealth also have an impact, though a much smaller one, on savings in the short run. More interestingly, housing 
wealth effects seem to be at play in the short run but with a positive sign. This means that a positive change in 
housing wealth will increase savings in the short term. Changes in unemployment, used as a proxy for uncertainty, 
are also found to have an impact on the household saving rate in the short run. 
Co-integrating equation: Long-run elasticities of 
household savings (1) Short-run elasticities of household savings  
(1)The variables are all non-stationary. The Johansen approach was used to test 
for cointegration and to estimate the equation.   
(2)All estimated coefficients are s ignificant at 1% 
Source: Commission services. 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote respectively  statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
Source: Commission services. 
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financing and mortgage equity withdrawal 
(MEW).6 The use of MEW remains limited in 
most euro-area countries (with the exception of 
the Netherlands) due to prohibitive transaction 
costs and regulatory constraints. Moreover, the 
short-run effect on consumption is limited as 
MEW in many cases goes back into housing as 
house improvements. Additionally, the impact 
varies over time as the availability and price of 
unsecured credit changes, making the relation 
very unstable.7 
Graph 13: Real house prices  
(index 1980Q1=100 ; 1980Q1-2007Q4) 
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Source: OECD. 
The empirical evidence on wealth effects in 
the euro area is limited 
Available econometric studies point to limited 
housing wealth effects in euro-area Member 
States. For instance, a comprehensive study by 
the OECD concludes that in France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, the propensity to consume out of 
financial wealth is of 1 to 2 per cent.8 In contrast, 
housing wealth effects vary significantly across 
countries: they are insignificant in Germany and 
France whereas in Italy and Spain they are of a 
                                                     
6  Calza, A., T. Monacelli, and L. Stracca (2007), 'Mortgage 
markets, collateral constraints, and monetary policy: Do 
institutional factors matter?', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
6231. 
7  Bridges, S, R. Disney, and J. Gathergood (2006), 'Housing 
collateral and household indebtedness: is there a 
household financial accelerator?', Czech National Bank, 
Working paper 2006/12. 
8  Catte, P., Girouard, N., Price, R. and C. Andre (2004), 
'Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle', OECD 
Economics department Working Paper n. 394. 
similar order of magnitude as financial wealth 
effects.  
Graph 14 supports the conclusion that housing 
wealth effects do not play an important role for 
private consumption at the level of the euro area. 
Indeed, the strong correlation between 
household savings and the share of housing 
wealth (and de facto of financial wealth) in total 
wealth is particularly striking.9 From 2000, 
coinciding with the break in the savings ratio 
series, the share of housing wealth has risen 
continuously and as a result the share of financial 
wealth has decreased. This suggests that 
households consider only financial wealth to be a 
substitute for savings. This conclusion is backed 
up by the empirical estimations presented in 
Box 1 where housing wealth is found to be non-
significant in the long run. The fact that housing 
wealth enters with the wrong sign in the 
estimated short-term equation of the savings 
ratio also suggests that the effect of house prices 
on consumption via the collateral channel is, at 
this stage, not an issue in the euro area. 
Graph 14: Household savings and share of housing 
wealth (in billion euro and in % of total wealth)  
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Source: Commission services and ECB. 
High household debt is probably weighing 
on consumption  
The increase in housing wealth since the late 
1990s has been associated with a surge in 
mortgage loans. In the last few years, household 
debt has been accumulated at very high rates by 
                                                     
9  The share of housing was used because according to the 
permanent income theory, household savings are a 
function of income and wealth.  
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historical standards. At the end of 2007, the total 
level of household debt had climbed to 53% of 
GDP and 80% of disposable income. More than 
70% of total debt was held in the form of 
mortgage credit. The increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio since the mid-1990s can be fully 
accounted for by the rise in mortgages 
(Graph 15).  
Graph 15: Household debt  
(in % of GDP – 1980Q1-2007Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
While surging house prices have contained the 
effect of debt accumulation on household 
balance sheets,10 there are three channels (on top 
of the housing wealth effects already discussed) 
through which higher debt may affect the cyclical 
response of consumption. 
A first important channel is the sensitivity of 
households' debt burden to changes in interest 
rates. The effect on consumption  will depend on 
the share of loans taken at variable interest rates. 
Only in Spain and Ireland do mortgages with 
variable interest rates represent a significant share 
of outstanding mortgages. Italy has introduced 
adjustable-rate mortgages only since 2006, while 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium 
still have mostly fixed-rate mortgages.11 At the 
euro-area level, due to the high volume of 
mortgages taken at fixed interest rates, the debt 
burden is not very sensitive to changes in the 
short-term nominal interest rate. The estimated 
semi-elasticity has a value of 0.15, meaning that a 
1 pp increase in the short-term nominal interest 
                                                     
10  Real non-financial households' leverage defined as the 
ratio of mortgage debt to net real housing wealth has 
been stable in the euro area at 14% over the last decade.  
11  European Mortgage Federation (2006). 
rate will increase households' debt service by 
0.15% (see Box 2).  
A second channel relates to households' capacity 
to withstand adverse income shocks. To the 
extent that it raises the burden of debt servicing, 
a higher level of debt will increase households' 
vulnerability to income shocks (and hence the 
possibility of default). The ratio of debt services 
(i.e. interest paid by households) to disposable 
income has shown a rapid rise since 2005, 
indicating a higher exposure to income shocks 
although the level reached remains broadly 
comparable to the previous cyclical peak in 2000 
(Graph 16). 
Graph 16: Households interest-only debt service (1) 
(in % of disposable income – 1980Q1-2007Q4) 
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(1) Interest paid by households, Quarterly Sector Accounts, 
Eurostat. 
Source: Commission services. 
Finally, it cannot be excluded that the recent 
rapid pace of debt accumulation does not just 
represent an optimal response by households to 
better access to cheap credit but also some 
element of overshooting.12 The correction of a 
debt overhang could then imply cuts in 
consumer spending. Box 2 tests this hypothesis 
by estimating a mortgage-debt equation and 
checking to what extent departures of the debt 
level from its fundamental value may be followed 
by slower mortgage growth and by a correction 
in private consumption. The econometric work 
suggests that this is indeed the case in the euro 
area: when the ratio of mortgage to net housing 
wealth exceeds its long-run value, consumption is
                                                     
12  For instance due to unrealistic expectations regarding 
future growth in house prices or the persistence of low 
interest rates. 
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subsequently reduced, with a 1 pp of debt 
overshooting leading to a decrease in the ratio of 
consumption to net housing wealth of about 
2.1% in the short run. The econometric evidence 
also shows that mortgage debt in the euro area 
seems to have somewhat overshot its 
fundamental level since 2006Q4. This may have 
weighed on consumer spending, shaving on 
average 0.3 pp off annual consumption growth, 
and is likely to continue to rein in consumer 
spending in the short term. Even if the 
magnitude of the estimated overshooting remains 
moderate so far, it will probably continue to 
grow as the downward correction in real house 
prices leads to decreasing housing wealth value. 
Conclusion 
Household consumption dynamics have been 
weak in the euro area in recent years. Part of this 
weakness may be attributed to a change in the 
households' savings ratio after the turn of the 
century on the back of less supportive growth in 
financial wealth. After three decades of 
continuous decline, the saving ratio has stabilised 
at its 2000 level. This development can be 
explained by a similar inflexion in the rapid rise 
of household financial wealth. 
Looking forward, the risks attached to falling 
house prices seem to be rather limited as housing 
wealth and collateral effects do not seem to play 
an important role for private consumption in the 
euro area. However, the rapid accumulation of 
household mortgage debt over the past decade 
has probably been associated with some 
overshooting. This may have weighed on 
consumption in recent years and will likely 
continue to hamper consumption growth in the 
immediate future. Even if estimates of this effect 
remain moderate, the risk of overshooting is 
likely to continue to be present as real housing 
wealth value decreases. 
Box 2: Consumption and household debt in the euro area 
Sensitivity of the debt burden to changes in the short-term interest rate.  
Households' debt burden (i.e. the interest paid on the debt) is determined by the stock of debt and the interest rate. 
The estimated semi-elasticity of the debt burden to the interest rate in the euro area is 0.15, meaning that a 1 
percentage point increase in the short term nominal interest rate increases the debt burden by 0.15%.  
Notes – Estimation method:  Dynamic OLS. Sample: 1999Q1 to  2007Q4, Eurostat. (1) All estimates are significant at 1% level.   
 
Mortgage loans and consumption 
There is no long-run cointegrating relation between mortgage loans and consumption. In a long-run equation that 
relates the mortgage loans ratio to net real housing wealth to its long-run determinants, the consumption ratio to net 
housing wealth does not appear statistically significant. The long-term real interest rate is found to be the main long-
run determinant for the mortgage loans ratio to net housing wealth.  
 Mortgage loans to net housing wealth ratio (1) 
Consumption to net 
housing wealth ratio 
Long-term real 
interest rate Constant
Co-integrating equation (1) 1.000 -0.066 1.277*** -14.47 
 D(Mortgage loans to net 
housing wealth ratio) 
D (Consumption to net 
housing wealth ratio) 
D(Long term real 
interest rate)  
Error Correction Term (lagged) -0.0003 -0.021** -0.087***  
(1)The variables are all non-stationary. 
Notes – Estimation method: Johansen proc edure for the first step. The VAR in first differences has 2 lags and includes the error correction term, a constant and changes 
in short-run nominal interest rate as an exogenous variable. Sample: 1980Q1 to 2007Q4. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical s ignificance at 1, 5, and 10% level.   
 
The error correction term above gives the short run correction in the endogenous variables for 1pp deviation of 
mortgage loans ratio from its long-run determinants. The results show that if the ratio of mortgage to net housing 
wealth had previously been larger than the long-run value determined by the long-term real interest rate then this 
disequilibrium would cause a decrease in the short run in the ratio of consumption to net housing wealth of 2.1% for 
1 pp of overshooting. By comparing the actual mortgage loans ratio to that predicted by the cointegrating equation, 
there seems to have been some overshooting in the years 1995 to 2003 and in the years 2006 and 2007. The 
magnitude of overshooting since 2006Q4 has affected the ratio of consumption to net housing wealth by decreasing 
its annual growth rate with 0.3 pp on average over the period 2006Q4 to 2007Q4.  
Variables (1) Dependent variable: Households' debt burden  
Short-term nominal interest rate 0.15 
Stock of debt 0.62 
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3.  The fiscal stance and the stabilisation 
role of fiscal policy revisited 
Repeated episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in 
the euro area have been an issue of debate. Prima 
facie, these experiences with fiscal policy in the 
run-up to and during EMU seem to have 
vindicated critics who have argued that the 
Stability and Growth Pact would hamper the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy.13 However, 
as argued in this note, a closer examination of the 
data shows that at least some of these episodes 
should be interpreted with caution. To begin 
with, compared to the US, the track record of 
fiscal stabilisation in the euro area improves 
when, in addition to discretionary measures, 
automatic stabilisers are taken into account. 
Moreover, in several instances pro-cyclicality was 
not a deliberate part of fiscal plans. It rather 
resulted from an over-optimistic appraisal of 
medium-term growth prospects, an incorrect 
judgement of the prevailing cyclical conditions 
and, in turn a fiscal stance, which with the benefit 
of hindsight turned out to have been 
unwarranted. Nevertheless, in some cases 
spending of windfall revenues also played a role 
and exacerbated the pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy. 
At first glance, the stabilisation function of 
discretionary fiscal policy has been rather 
poor in the euro area… 
Pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is a widespread 
phenomenon around the world. Studies find that 
in developing and middle income countries fiscal 
policy has frequently moved with the cycle. For 
developed economies the findings are more 
nuanced and depend on the time period and 
countries considered. When fiscal policy has 
been pro-cyclical in industrial countries, it has 
                                                     
13  The first concern was that the Stability and Growth Pact 
would limit stabilisation efforts in cyclical downturns (see 
for example European Commission (2008), 'Successes 
and challenges after 10 years of EMU', European 
Economy No. 2, 2008; Canzoneri, M.B. and B.T. Diba 
(2001) 'The SGP: delicate balance or albatross?', in: A. 
Brunilla, M. Buti and D. Franco (eds.), 'The Stability and 
Growth Pact', Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 53-74).  
Moreover, it was argued that the fiscal rules of EMU 
would not provide sufficient incentives for fiscal 
consolidation in economic good times (see for example, 
Buti, M. and G. Giudice (2002), 'Maastricht's fiscal rules 
at ten: an assessment', Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 823-848). 
mostly been in good economic times.14 The 
deficit bias in good times has largely been 
attributed to political economic motives as policy 
makers attach more weight to other objectives 
than the stabilisation of output. In particular, 
when competing for public resources ministers 
tend to neglect the repercussions of their 
decisions on overall public finances. This 
'common pool problem' gets worse in good 
economic times as more overall resources are 
available.  
Pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy has also emerged as 
a key characteristic of the euro area. The 
introduction of the euro does not seem to have 
weakened the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise 
cyclical swings in general, but it has been possible 
to observe a change in the fiscal behaviour across 
the different phases of the economic cycle.  
Graph 17: Fiscal stance in good and bad times, 
euro area (1) 
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 (1) Good times correspond to periods of positive output gaps and 
bad times to periods of negative output gaps. The graph shows the 
average change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). 
Caution is only needed for the interpretation of the period 1992-
1998 in good times, since it includes only a single year (1992). 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph 17 shows the fiscal stance, as measured by 
the average change in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB), in the EU-11 countries 
(euro area excluding CY, LU, MT and SI) for 
three different sub-periods. The cyclical 
conditions dimension is captured by 
differentiating between years in which the output 
gap is estimated to have been positive (good 
times) or negative (bad times). In the period 
                                                     
14  See for example Manasse, P. (2006), 'Procyclical fiscal 
policy: shocks, rules, and institutions—A view from 
MARS', IMF Working Paper 06/26 and Alesina, A. and G. 
Tabellini (2005), 'Why is fiscal policy often pro-cyclical?', 
NBER Working Paper, No. 11600. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 19 -  
preceding Maastricht (1980-1991), there is a clear 
pro-cyclical stance in both stages of the cycle: the 
fiscal stance is on average expansionary in good 
times and contractionary in bad times. The 
pattern changed in the second sub-period (1992-
1998) when the eleven countries, in an effort to 
fulfil the Maastricht criteria for adopting the 
euro, ran on average tight fiscal policies 
irrespective of the cyclical position.15 After the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact in 
1997 and the single currency in 1999, the pattern 
has shifted back to what it was in pre-Maastricht 
times with pro-cyclicality in good times being 
particularly pronounced.  
Graph 18: Ex-post fiscal stance (discretionary changes) 
and cyclical conditions, euro area and United States 
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Based on the traditional analysis, which looks 
only at the role of discretionary fiscal policy, the 
euro-area's fiscal policy emerges as having been 
more pro-cyclical than that of the United States. 
Graph 18 depicts the discretionary fiscal stance 
and the cyclical conditions for both areas. All 
data points that lie in the upper left and lower 
right quadrants indicate times in which fiscal 
policy has been pro-cyclical, while the other two 
quadrants depict counter-cyclical periods. As 
mentioned above, euro-area fiscal policy was 
characterised by strong pro-cyclical fiscal 
tightening in the run-up to EMU, followed by an 
adjustment fatigue that created a pro-cyclical 
fiscal loosening despite sustained economic 
growth (2000-2001). When economic conditions 
deteriorated from 2002, fiscal policy tightened 
again and then moved towards a neutral stance 
                                                     
15  The on average counter-cyclical stance in good times in 
1992-1998 must be interpreted with caution since the 
output gap was positive only in a single year (1992). 
during the upswing in 2005-2007. This pattern 
seems to be in contrast with the experience 
recorded in the US where the discretionary fiscal 
policy has turned out to be counter-cyclical ex-
post even though this was not its prime objective 
in every year. In particular, the sharp turnaround 
from a cyclically-adjusted primary surplus in 2000 
to a deficit of more than 3% of GDP in 2002 
was not only a response to the economic 
slowdown following the bursting of the ICT 
bubble in 2001 but it largely reflected (i) the 
increase in defence spending and (ii) tax cuts with 
an electoral motive. 
… but automatic stabilisers have helped to 
smooth cycles  
To fully assess the stabilisation function of fiscal 
policy, also the role of automatic stabilisers needs 
to taken into account. They include those 
budgetary arrangements which lead to an 
automatic change of government revenue and 
expenditure as a per cent of GDP over the cycle. 
In view of the generally larger size of 
governments and more progressive tax systems, 
automatic stabilisers are more important in the 
euro area than in the US. Commonly used 
estimates indicate that a cyclical decline of GDP 
of 1% in the euro area raises the fiscal deficit 
ratio by ½ a percentage point as opposed to an 
increase by ⅓ of a percentage point in the US. 16 
What this important difference implies for fiscal 
stabilisation is shown in Graphs 18 and 19. The 
blue lines depict the discretionary fiscal policy 
stance as measured by the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance, while the red lines depict the 
total 'first-round impact' of fiscal policy as 
measured by the annual change of the primary 
deficit. When this full fiscal impact is considered 
(discretionary and automatic stabilisers), the 
stabilisation record of the euro area improves 
visibly (Graph 19). This is especially the case in 
years, when the cycle was particularly good or 
bad. In 1993, for instance, when economic 
activity in the euro area was 2 pp below potential, 
the counter-cyclical effect of the automatic fiscal 
stabilisers more than offset the pro-cyclical 
stance of discretionary fiscal policy. This gave 
rise to an overall expansionary fiscal impulse. A 
                                                     
16  Girouard, N. and C. Andre (2005),'Measuring cyclically-
adjusted budget balances for the OECD countries', 
OECD Working Paper, No. 434. 
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similar observation applies to the year 2003, after 
the bursting of the ICT bubble. An example of 
exceptionally good economic times in which 
automatic stabilisers helped to dampen the fiscal 
stance was the year 2000. In the US, by contrast, 
the relative weakness of automatic stabilisers did 
not modify the pro- or counter-cyclicality of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In Graph 20 the blues 
and red lines therefore lie very closely together. 
Graph 19: Ex post fiscal stance: discretionary changes 
and automatic stabilisation, euro area 
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Sources: Calculations by Commission services and OECD. 
The lessons to be drawn from this analysis are 
two-fold. Firstly, the higher and more counter-
cyclical fiscal activism in the US could be 
interpreted as an attempt to make up for weaker 
automatic stabilisers. And secondly, the 
comparatively large automatic stabilisers in the 
euro area can make a difference and help partially 
counteracting discretionary fiscal policy making 
when the cycle turns particularly soar or 
particularly buoyant.17 
                                                     
17  While this last point seems to argue for large 
governments from a stabilisation point of view, 
experience suggests that there is an upper limit at which 
the beneficial effects of automatic stabilisers are being 
outweighed by long-run costs for economic growth 
through additional tax burden and inefficient public 
administrations. Simulations put this threshold at a 
maximum of 50% of GDP, but depending on economic 
structures it can also be significantly lower (see for 
example, Buti, M., C. Martinez-Mongay, K. Sekkat and P. 
Van den Noord (2003) 'Automatic fiscal stabilisers in 
EMU: A conflict between efficiency and stabilisation?', 
CESifo Economic Studies, 49(1), 123-140 and X. Debrun, 
Pisani-Ferry, J. and Sapir A. (2008) 'Government size and 
output volatility: Should we forsake automatic 
stabilization', Economic Papers, N.316, European Commission, 
April). 
Policy plans were sometimes build on too 
optimistic growth projections  
When assessing discretionary fiscal policy 
making, not only the outcomes but also the 
policy intentions should be considered, based on 
information about the economic cycle at the 
time. Since output gap estimates are derived from 
expectations about future economic growth, 
policy makers are faced with a forecasting 
problem (see Box 3).18 This uncertainty 
surrounding the economic cycle in real time can 
drive a wedge between plans and outcomes.19  
Graph 20: Ex post fiscal stance: discretionary changes 
and automatic stabilisation, United States 
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Sources: Calculations by Commission services and OECD. 
To shed light on the difference between 
outcomes and how things looked at the time, 
Graphs 21-22 depict the information available in 
real time of both the economic cycle and the 
budget balance.20 Two important points follow 
for the euro area. Firstly, Graph 21 confirms the 
                                                     
18  Statistical data revisions can also explain the difference 
between real-time and ex post output gaps. In practice, 
however, their impact is relatively small compared to 
forecast errors.  
19  For a detailed assessment of the forecast errors of the 
output gap in the euro area see European Commission, 
'Adjustment dynamics in the euro area – Experience and 
challenges', European Review 2006, European Economy 
No. 6, January, pp. 306-307. 
20  The two graphs are based on real-time OECD estimates 
of the output gap for two reasons. Firstly, OECD real-
time output gap estimates are available since 1995. And 
secondly, the OECD growth forecasts, which enter the 
real-time estimates of the output gap, should a priori be 
free of the calculated optimism to which governments' 
forecasts may fall pray. The graphs show the OECD 
estimates for the output gap in t produced in spring of 
the same year. This allows to match them with the real-
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pro-cyclical stance in the second half of the 
1990s reflecting the policy priorities of the EU 
fiscal framework in the run-up to the euro, 
notably to bring the government deficit below 
the 3% of GDP threshold. Secondly, the pro- 
cyclical loosening recorded in 2000 and 2001 was 
not in the plans. Based on the assessment at the 
time, the fiscal stance could be taken as a 
'reasoned' response to a cyclical position that was 
perceived to be moving from potential to below-
potential while, over the medium term, the 
economy was expected to return to the high-
growth path of the late 1990s.  
Graph 21: Real-time fiscal stance and cyclical 
conditions, euro area (1) 
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(1) OECD estimates of the output gap for year t produced in spring 
of the same year. 
(2) Change in CAPB, % of GDP. 
Sources: Commission services and OECD. 
 
By contrast, the gap between the real-time and 
ex-post fiscal stance was generally smaller in the 
US and, more importantly, did not markedly alter 
the overall thrust of fiscal policy. The counter-
cyclical nature of fiscal plans was largely realised.  
Negative growth surprises (genuine and not) 
are largely to blame  
For the euro area negative growth surprises are 
one of the culprits in turning well-behaved plans 
into pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Fiscal plans were 
often built on a rather optimistic view about 
potential future growth. This translated into 
growth projections that positioned current GDP 
levels below potential. Thus, real-time estimates 
                                                                              
time fiscal stance of the same year, which includes both 
the budget adopted at the end of t-1 plus any additional 
measures taken or adopted at the beginning of t.  
of the output gap were on the pessimistic side 
and seemed to justify an expansionary fiscal 
stance.21 In most cases this macroeconomic 
assessment was in line with the consensus view, 
but in some cases, macro-forecasts have been 
used strategically to bring budgetary plans in line 
with the requirements of the SGP from an ex-
ante point of view, thereby contributing to 
systematic slippages from targets ex post.22  
Graph 22: Real-time fiscal stance and cyclical 
conditions, United States (1) 
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(1) OECD estimates of the output gap in for year t produced in 
spring of the same year. 
(2) Change in CAPB, % of GDP. 
Sources: Commission services and OECD. 
In the euro area during 1996-2006, the output 
gap was on average underestimated by 0.7% of 
GDP (Graph 23) based on OECD forecasts. 
This underestimation was even bigger based on 
government projections. The consistent 
overestimation of the euro-area trend growth 
partly reflects the overestimation of the 
adjustment capacity of the European economies 
to shocks which were not factored into the 
projections.23 As medium-term growth 
                                                     
21  Real-time output gap estimates are derived from 
expectations about future economic growth. To the 
extent that medium-term growth prospects are 
overestimated (or underestimated) the real-time estimate 
of the output gap in the current period will be on the 
pessimistic (or optimistic) side. 
22  More generally, studies find a bias for optimism in 
government growth and budget forecasts (e.g., Jonung L. 
and M. Larch (2006), 'Fiscal policy in the EU. Are official 
output forecasts biased?', Economic Policy, July, pp. 491-534 
and Strauch, R., M. Hallerberg and J. von Hagen (2004). 
‘Budgetary forecasts in Europe: The track record of 
stability and convergence programmes’, ECB Working 
Paper No. 307). 
23  While the euro area's cumulated loss in the output gap 
that followed the bursting of the ICT bubble in 2000 was 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2008 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
projections did not materialise, especially after 
1999, and taking into account that it is generally 
easier to cope with positive growth surprises, the 
planned fiscal stance turned out to be 
inappropriate from a stabilisation point of view. 
In hindsight, the output gap was positive in the 
years 1999-2001, rather than negative as 
perceived at the time. Thus, the fiscal stance was 
pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical as 
envisaged. 
Graph 23: Forecast errors of the output gap, euro area 
and United States (1) (2) (% of potential GDP) 
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(1) Real-time output gap minus ex-post estimates by the OECD. 
(2) The large difference between real-time and ex post estimates for 
the US in the second half of the 1990s also reflects statistical 
revisions of national accounts data. The largest revision took place 
in 1999, when GDP was raised by 1 to 2%. However, assuming that 
this revision had a full impact on the output gap estimate would not 
alter the policy implications of the real-time estimates for the US. 
Sources: Calculations by Commission services and OECD. 
The US, on the other hand, grew more strongly 
than projected in the late 1990s but since then 
growth surprises have been small (Graph 23). 
This reflects a more realistic or conservative 
assessment of growth prospects, explaining the 
greater match between the planned and ex-post 
fiscal stance. 
Moreover, spending of revenue windfalls has 
exacerbated pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
In 2000-2001, when the pro-cyclical nature of 
fiscal policy in the euro area was particularly 
evident, fiscal loosening went beyond the effect 
                                                                              
very similar to the one observed in the US, the more 
protracted economic slowdown in the euro area was not 
expected. This higher degree of sluggishness in the euro-
area cycle reflects higher market rigidities, which weigh on 
an economy’s capacity to adjust to shocks.  
stemming from the incorrect assessment of the 
cyclical position in real time. Policy makers had 
been confronted with buoyant inflows of tax 
revenues since 1996, which went beyond the 
expansion of aggregate economic activity and led 
to an increase of implicit tax rates above the 
long-term average (Graph 24). Although due 
diligence should have led to the conclusion that 
the above average tax content of growth was 
unlikely to be permanent, the policy response 
was to reduce taxes or to increase expenditure at 
a moment when the economy was de facto 
operating above its potential. This choice turned 
out to be particularly unfortunate also for the 
following years, as it substantially reduced the 
room for macroeconomic stabilisation during the 
economic slowdown.  
Graph 24: Apparent and average tax elasticities, euro 
area (in % of GDP) 
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(1) As estimated for the euro area-11 by the OECD (see Girouard, 
N. and C. André (2005), 'Measuring cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances for OECD countries' OECD Working Paper 434).  
Sources: Commission services and OECD. 
Progress in two institutional areas could help 
limit the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy  
Even though this closer look at fiscal policy has 
revealed that fiscal policy in the euro area has 
been more successful in stabilising output than 
commonly perceived, a number of elements 
could be further improved to support the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy. 
Stronger national budgetary institutions: Experience 
has shown that strong budgetary institutions, in 
particular numerical fiscal rules and medium-
term budgetary frameworks, can contribute to 
greater fiscal discipline. Certain types of fiscal 
rules, especially medium-term nominal 
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expenditure rules and revenue rules that pre-
define the use of revenue windfalls, have helped 
contain pressures for additional expenditure or 
tax cuts in good times, thereby reducing pro-
cyclicality. 24 This success has built on strong 
political commitment and effective monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                     
24  See for example European Commission, Public Finances in 
EMU 2006 and 2007. 
More cautious macroeconomic forecasts: Better fiscal 
governance could also help remedy the 
macroeconomic forecast bias. One option would 
be to involve independent fiscal institutions in 
preparing macroeconomic assumptions for the 
budget.25    
                                                     
25  For a discussion on the role of independent fiscal 
agencies, see for example Jonung and Larch (2006), op. 
cit., and Debrun, X., D. Hauner and M.S. Kumar (2007), 
'The role of fiscal agencies', in: Kumar, M.S. and T. Ter-
Minassian (eds.), Promoting fiscal discipline, IMF. 
Box 3: The difficulties in assessing the output gap in real time 
 
The output gap is an unobservable variable since it measures the percentage deviation of actual from potential 
output, with the latter being a theoretical construct. Most methods to estimate potential output (y) for year t involve 
a centred and symmetric function of GDP or parts of GDP (TFP in the case of the production function method).(*) 
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where, on the right hand side of the equation, output figures of the current year (which one may denote as T) and 
beyond typically represent forecasts, i.e. for t+j > T. In plain words: the current position of the economy in the cycle 
very much depends on where it is expected to be headed in the future. Consequently, forecast errors for real GDP 
translate into revisions of the output gap as historical data become available. 
  
A possible way to improve the real-time output gap estimate: As discussed in this section, there have been 
substantial differences between real-time and ex post output gap estimates. For 2005-2006, this gap has narrowed, 
but the estimates that the output gap was still negative for that period have been questioned since many other 
economic variables, such as capacity utilisation, employment rates, labour productivity and inflation, have indicated 
that the euro area reached the peak of the cycle. Thus eventually, the output gap may be revised as the above 
calculations are applied, and they could reveal once again large differences in real-time and ex post figures. 
 
A way forward to address the uncertainty attached to real-time output gap estimates could be to complement the 
assessment of cyclical conditions with other economic indicators that can reflect cyclical developments. This would 
be in line with the provisions of the Code of Conduct of the Stability and Growth Pact according to which 'the 
identification of periods of economic 'good times' should be made after an overall economic assessment.' First 
estimates for the output gap using the principal component approach, applied to a battery of leading indicators of 
the economic cycle, show some promising results. When simulating real-time output gap estimates for 2000-2006, 
the forecast accuracy of the real-time output gap (measured by the root mean squared error) can be improved for 
eight of the EU-11 countries (see table below). However, the size of improvements varies strongly and depends on 
the model used. This suggests that a case-by-case approach is needed for a better real-time assessment of the cycle.  
 
Accuracy of real-time output gap estimates based on complementary indicators: simulations for 2000-06 
 Complementary 
indicators, without 
production capacity 
Complementary indicators, 
with production capacity 
Output gap, real time  
(AMECO 2007) 
 Root mean squared error Root mean squared error Root mean squared error 
Austria 1,41 na 0,85 
Belgium 0,78 0,74 0,75 
Finland 2,02 1,48 0,60 
France 0,92 0,99 0,99 
Germany 1,56 1,10 1,11 
Greece 1,47 0,81 1,21 
Ireland 2,77 3,05 1,77 
Italy 1,31 1,75 1,45 
The Netherlands 0,95 0,93 1,21 
Portugal 1,54 2,29 1,83 
Spain 1,14 1,33 1,32 
Note: Lowest RMSE is indicated in bold for each country. 
Source: European Commission, 2007. 
 
(*) For the European Commission's method see Denis, C., D. Grenouilleau, K. Mc Morrow and W. Röger, 2006, 'Calculating 
potential growth rates and output gaps—A revised production function approach', Economic Paper, No. 247, Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission.  
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4.  Exporters' hedging strategies against 
exchange rate fluctuations  
This section sheds light on one of the elements 
that have contributed to the euro area resilience 
of exports to the appreciation of the euro over 
the past years, namely the hedging strategies of 
euro-area exporters against exchange rate 
variations.26 We first discuss exchange-rate 
related risk and hedge design and then survey the 
literature on the use of hedging. We find that the 
use of hedging strategies and instruments is 
empirically well documented for the US and 
some individual European countries, but little is 
so far known about hedging from a euro area 
perspective. With a survey of self-reported 
hedging strategies and instruments of euro-area 
blue chip companies this section contributes to 
closing that gap.  
Types of risk and hedge design  
Classifications of exchange rate risk in the 
literature differ somewhat. Here, the following 
taxonomy is used: Transaction risk refers to the 
impact of exchange rate variations on committed 
cash flows (where the nominal amount and the 
date of the payment are already certain). Economic 
risk refers to the impact of the exchange rate on 
uncertain future cash flows. Importantly, this 
includes the risk of changes in demand for 
exported goods as the exchange rate varies. 
Finally, translation risk refers to the impact of 
exchange rate variations on the valuation of 
foreign assets or liabilities on a multinational 
firm's balance sheet.  
Exchange rate risk can be eliminated, at least 
partly, though appropriate hedging. Protection 
against exchange rate risk can be achieved 
through geographical diversification in a way to 
match revenues and expenditure in various 
currencies ('operational hedging') or through the use 
of financial instruments ('financial hedging'). 
Financial hedges can be divided into hedges 
based on exchange rate derivatives such as 
forwards/futures, options and swaps and hedges 
building on foreign-currency borrowing or 
                                                     
26  It draws on Döhring, B. (2008), 'Hedging and invoicing 
strategies to reduce exchange rate exposure: a euro-area 
perspective', European Economy – Economic Papers, No. 299, 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
European Commission.  
lending. An alternative categorisation 
distinguishes between 'derivative hedges' and 'natural 
hedges' where the latter comprise all non-
derivative strategies, i.e. operational hedges as 
well as borrowing/lending.  
Financial derivatives have today become standard 
tools for hedging exchange rate risk. Table 4 
illustrates the rapid increase in the use of 
exchange rate derivatives as reported by the BIS 
for products that are traded 'over-the counter'.  
Table 4: Over-the-counter foreign exchange 
derivatives 
 Notional amounts outstanding (bn US$) 
by instrument and maturity by currency (1)
  déc-04 déc-07  déc-07 
total contracts 29.298 56.238 USD 46.947 
forwards and swaps 23.174 43.490 EUR 21.806 
maturity < 1y 17.522 31.172 JPY 12.857 
maturity 1-5y  3.676 6.176 GBP 7.979 
maturity > 5 y 1.976 6.142 CHF 3.662 
options  6.115 12.748 CND 2.404 
maturity < 1y 5.312 9.144 AUD 2.227 
maturity 1-5y  710 2.377 SEK 1.525 
maturity > 5 y 93 1.227 total 56.238 
  
(1) As instruments may involve more than one currency, the sum of 
the instruments by currency is larger than the total of all instruments. 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review June 2007 & 2008.  
Transaction risk can be easily hedged using 
standard products (in particular forwards). 
Hedging becomes more difficult for the longer 
term, because the cash flow is usually uncertain 
(economic risk). Applying standard products to 
uncertain future cash flows creates the risk of 
mismatches between the hedge and the 
underlying cash flow, in which case an open 
exposure remains. What is more, standard 
products for the long run may not be available 
(futures) or quite expensive (options). 
Derivatives with short maturities can in principle 
be 'rolled over' to cover long-term exposure. 
However, rolling over short-term instruments 
does not eliminate risk in the same way as an 
instrument with the correct maturity would. In 
particular, the value of rolled-over hedges is 
sensitive to changes in interest rates and forward 
rates. These reasons explain why exchange-
traded derivatives play only a minor role, as 
compared to OTC products, in Europe.  
It should also be noted that even perfect 
derivative hedges can lead to temporary losses 
between the moment of purchase and their 
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maturity due to accounting practices and 
obligations to 'mark to market'. Although such 
losses are temporary, they can constitute a 
significant drain on a firm's liquidity.  
An example illustrates the limitations of 
derivative hedges when it comes to economic 
risk. Consider a euro-area exporter of large 
investment goods (such as ships or airplanes) 
who regularly receives orders for sales 
denominated in US dollar. As the time between 
the order and final delivery (payment) is several 
years, the exporter 'locks in' the EUR-USD 
exchange rate using exchange-rate forwards each 
time an order is firmly committed. However, the 
forward exchange rate varies over time (it is a 
function of the spot rate and the interest rate 
differential between the euro area and the US). 
Therefore, the value in euro of equivalent hedged 
US dollar sales differs depending on the forward 
rate at which the transaction was hedged.  
In the case of a prolonged appreciation of the 
euro against the US dollar (assuming a constant 
interest-rate differential), the exporter thus has to 
accept successively less favourable forward rates 
for his exchange rate hedges, cutting into its 
profit margin.  
Natural hedges are an alternative way of reducing 
exchange rate exposure. Foreign currency loans 
are functional substitutes to forwards and 
futures. However, loans can easily cover longer 
maturities than derivatives (e.g. a firm with access 
to international capital markets may hedge future 
revenues in US dollar by issuing a US dollar 
bond). More generally, exchange rate exposure 
can be reduced by matching foreign-currency 
revenues with foreign-currency expenditure. 
Operational hedges involve geographical 
diversification of production, sourcing and/or 
sales. Since operational hedges are less flexible 
than financial hedges, and involve higher sunk 
costs, they are typically used to reduce longer-
term exposure to economic risk. The matching 
of foreign-currency assets with foreign-currency 
liabilities also offers protection against translation 
risk. 
Use and effectiveness of hedges – a survey of 
the literature 
The exchange rate exposure of a large sample of 
multinational firms with headquarters in the euro 
area has been assessed by Muller and Verschoor 
(2006).27 The authors find that euro-area 
exporters are mainly exposed to variations in the 
exchange rate of the US dollar, pound Sterling 
and yen. Exposure to short-run exchange rate 
variations is low (probably because it is well 
hedged), but it remains substantial over longer 
time horizons.  
However, surprisingly little is known about 
hedging strategies of European firms. Much of 
the empirical literature focuses on the US, 
although some comparisons of hedging strategies 
between US and German firms, and US and 
Dutch firms are available. Also, the use of 
derivatives by Swedish firms has been surveyed.  
For the US, evidence on hedging has been 
gathered in the 'Wharton Surveys for Financial Risk 
Management' carried out between 1994 and 1998 
among large non-financial firms. The 1998 
survey finds 44% of respondents used financial 
derivatives, 79% of which used them to hedge 
currency risk (73% hedged interest rate risks and 
44% commodity risks). Bodnar et al (2003) 
provide comparable data for US and Dutch 
firms; Bodnar and Gebhard (1999) comparable 
results for US and German firms.28 The main 
features of these surveys are summarised in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
The surveys indicate that derivative use increases 
with firm size. This suggests that there are fixed 
costs involved in running a derivative hedge 
programme (Alkebäck et al, 2006, and Hagelin, 
2003, come to the same conclusion).29 
                                                     
27  Muller, A. and W. Verschoor (2006), 'European foreign 
exchange rate risk exposure', European Financial 
Management, Vol. 12(2), pp. 195-220. 
28  Bodnar, G., A. de Jong and V. Macrae (2003), 'The 
impact of institutional differences on derivatives sage: A 
comparative study of US and Dutch firms', European 
Financial Management, Vol.  9(3), pp. 271-297. 
Bodnar, G. and G. Gebhard (1999), 'Derivatives usage in 
risk management by US and German non-financial firms: 
a comparative survey', Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, Vol. 10, pp. 153-187. 
29  Alkebäck, P., N. Hagelin and B. Pramborg (2006), 
'Derivative usage by non-financial firms in Sweden 1996 
and 2003: What has changed?', Managerial Finance, 
Vol. 32(2), pp. 101-114; Hagelin, N. (2003), 'Why firms 
hedge with currency derivatives: An examination of 
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Table 5: Use of financial derivatives(%age of 
firms using financial hedges) 
country US DE   US NL
survey year 1995 1997   1998 1998
    - by firm size (sales in m USD) 
>6600 90 75    
3300-6600 73 94    
1660-3300 57 88    
660-1660 64 84 >800 82 88
330-660 44 55 250-800 46 57
<330 18 50 <250 12 42
    - by industry sector 
utilities 48 74 manufact. 46 66
service 56 100 trade 27 58
retail 42 76 services 41 48
motors 58 77    
mining 81 68    
metals 80 93    
machinery 62 100    
electro 69 87    
consumer 56 75    
construction 42 62    
chemicals 82 85    
Bodnar et al (2003)         
Source: Bodnar and Gebhard (1999).     
 
Table 6: Types of derivatives  
used to hedge exchange rate risk 
(instrument found 'most important' in %) 
  US NL
  1995 1998
OTC forwards 56 77
futures 12 0
swaps 8 2
OTC options 16 12
exchange-traded options 1 0
structured derivatives 6 7
hybrid debt 2 2
Source: Bodnar et al (2003).     
 
European firms are generally more likely to use 
derivative hedges than their US counterparts. 
The difference is particularly large for the smaller 
firms in the survey and holds across industrial 
sectors. Several authors have since stressed that 
                                                                              
transaction and translation exposure', Applied Financial 
Economics, Vol. 13,  pp. 55-69. 
the likelihood of firms hedging exchange rate risk 
increases with an economy's openness to trade.30  
The euro has had an impact on the use of 
derivatives to hedge exchange rate risk. Capstaff 
et al (2007)31 find that practically the same 
number of French multinational firms used 
derivatives to hedge exchange rate exposure 
before and after the introduction of the euro. As 
the euro reduced their exposure to exchange rate 
risk, the notional amounts of derivatives 
outstanding decreased. However, the exchange 
rate exposure decreased more strongly than the 
amounts hedged, indicating that hedging of the 
remaining risk may have become more intense.  
Firm-level studies that analyse the impact of 
exchange rate variations on share prices generally 
find hedging to be effective (i.e. hedging reduces 
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the 
share price). However, there is some 
disagreement as to the respective effectiveness of 
financial and operational hedges. Alayannis et al 
(2001) analyse the effectiveness of operational 
and financial hedging by US non-financial 
multinationals in 1996-1998.32 The authors use 
various measures of the geographical dispersion 
of the firm's operations as a proxy for 
operational hedging. They find that operational 
hedging on its own does not, on average, reduce 
exchange rate risk exposure. Financial hedges are 
effective on their own, and so is a combination 
of financial and operational hedging. Carter et al 
(2003) also analyse US multinationals (1994-98), 
and are more positive about the effectiveness of 
operational hedges.33 They find that operational 
hedges and financial hedges reduce exchange rate 
risk, whether used on their own or in a 
                                                     
30  See for instance Hagelin (2003) op.cit. and De Jong, A., J. 
Ligterink and V. Macrae (2006), 'A firm-specific analysis 
of the exchange-rate exposure of Dutch firms', Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 17(1),  
pp. 1-28. 
31  Capstaff, J., A. Marshall and J. Hutton (2007), 'The 
introduction of the euro and derivative use in French 
firms', Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, Vol. 18(1),  pp. 1-17. 
32  Alayannis, G., J. Ihrig and J. Weston (2001), 'Exchange-
rate hedging: financial versus operational strategies', 
American Economic Review, Vol. 91(2), pp. 391-395. 
33 Carter, D., C. Pantzalis and B. Simkins (2003), 'Firmwide 
risk management of foreign exchange exposure by U.S. 
multinational corporations', Oklahoma State University 
Working Paper. 
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coordinated manner and conclude that: 
'operational and financial hedges are complementary risk 
management strategies'. In a survey of Swedish firms, 
Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) find that derivative 
hedging as well as hedging with foreign-currency 
denominated debt reduces firms' exchange rate 
exposure.34 Moreover, they find that hedging can 
reduce both transaction risk and translation risk. 
However, the effectiveness of financial hedges is 
disputed by de Jong et al (2006), who use a 
sample of Dutch firms. Their results suggest that 
financial hedging does not reduce exchange rate 
exposure, while operational hedging does.  
Finally, risk managers may want to create 
asymmetric hedges in order to insure against 
adverse exchange rate developments without 
forgoing potential foreign exchange gains. Carter 
et al (2005)35 demonstrate that operational 
hedging can produce the desired asymmetry. 
They show that US multinationals' flexibility in 
international marketing, sourcing and production 
provides real (i.e. non-financial) options. 
'Operational flexibility enables the firm to selectively 
exploit favourable currency movements to maximise profit 
potential and minimise the impact of adverse currency 
movements.' As the authors stress, static geographic 
diversification reduces exchange rate risk in a 
symmetric way. Operational flexibility raises 
protection and adds an option value.  
Self-reported hedging by euro-area blue chip 
companies 
Data on large corporations' hedging strategy was 
gathered from financial publications36 of the 33 
non-financial firms included in the EuroStoxx50 
index (as of March 1997). The analysis of 
financial statements is a common approach in the 
literature on hedging practices (cf. Capstaff et al, 
                                                     
34 Hagelin, N. and B. Pramborg (2004), 'Hedging foreign 
exchange exposure: risk reduction from transaction and 
translation hedging', Journal of international financial 
management and accounting, Vol. 5(1).  
35 Carter, D., C. Pantzalis and B. Simkins (2005), 'Hedging, 
real options and the asymmetric exposure of US MNCs', 
http://www.fma.org/Stockholm/Papers/AsymmetricEx
posuretoFXRiskDec2005.pdf 
36 In most cases, Annual Reports contain sections on risk 
management, where the strategy for managing exchange 
rate risk is exposed in general terms. More detailed 
information can generally be found in the notes to the 
consolidated financial statements.  
2007).37 The 33 firms analysed cover the 
following sectors: Utilities (6 firms), 
telecommunications (4), three each from oil & 
gas, chemicals, personal & household goods and 
technology, two each from automobiles & parts, 
food & beverage, retail and construction & 
materials, one each from health care, industrial 
goods & services and media. As customary in the 
literature, financial firms have been excluded, as 
they are likely to hold significant amounts of 
derivatives that are not related to exports and 
imports of goods and services.  
The amount of information on the management 
of exchange rate risk provided in Annual Reports 
and consolidated financial statements varies 
across firms. For example, not all firms provide 
details on their hedging principles or on the 
relative importance of natural hedges vs. hedging 
with derivatives. Some also do not provide the 
notional amount of derivatives outstanding 
(which corresponds to the underlying exposure 
being covered) but only their fair value (which 
corresponds to the unrealised gains or losses 
from the hedging instruments). Reporting on 
maturities is also unsystematic. These gaps 
notwithstanding, the information gathered is 
consistent across firms, and rich enough to allow 
some generalisations.  
All firms analysed operate internationally, have 
subsidiaries abroad and are exposed to exchange 
rate risk. All but one of those companies that 
provide information on the main currencies to 
which they are exposed (Table 7) report exposure 
to the US dollar, be it directly and/or through 
currencies pegged to the USD. The pound 
Sterling is also mentioned by most. Many report 
additional exposures to other currencies, without 
there being any clear sectoral pattern. Among 
other currencies in Europe, the Polish zloty and 
the Swiss franc play the largest roles. Some have 
exposures in yen, with currencies from emerging 
markets in Asia also sometimes mentioned. 
Others have exposures to Latin American 
currencies, among which the Brazilian real plays 
an important role. Self-reported exchange rate 
risk exposure is thus both larger and (despite the 
strong role of the US dollar) more diverse than 
found in Muller and Verschoor (2006).38  
                                                     
37 Op. cit.  
38 Op. cit.  
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Table 7: Main currency exposures 
(number of mentions among main exposures 
  multiple mentions possible)  
To N. American currencies To Asian currencies   
  USD 29   JPY 8
  CAD 3   CNY 4
TTo European currencies  KRW 3
  GBP 20   other 3
  PLN 5 To L. American currencies 
  CHF 4   BRL 6
  other 8   other 5
Source: Annual Reports and Financial Statements for 2006. 
All firms report using derivative instruments to 
hedge exchange rate risk. The reported notional 
amounts of derivatives outstanding range from 
45 million euro to above 30 billion euro, with the 
largest number of firms reporting amounts in the 
range of one to ten billion euro (median: 
5.6 billion, see Graph 25). Holdings of exchange 
rate derivatives are quite large compared to 
revenue (see Graph 26). In most cases, they 
amount to 10-20% of revenue (median 15.7%), 
but substantially higher holdings of exchange rate 
derivatives are also not uncommon. Again, there 
is no clear sectoral pattern.  
Graph  25: Notional amount of exchange rate 
derivatives (non-financial firms included in the  
EuroStoxx50 – end 2006)  
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Source: Annual reports and financial statements, own calculations. 
A majority of surveyed firms uses a mix of 
forwards, options and swaps.  
• Exchange rate forwards are the most 
commonly used derivative tool (mentioned 
by 31 firms). Most companies use them to 
hedge future cash flows that are firmly 
committed or highly probable (transaction 
risk). Maturities up to 12 months are the 
most common, with some instruments 
maturing after 2-5 years, while maturities 
above 5 years are rare. Some firms cover 
longer-term exposure through rolling-over of 
derivatives with short maturities.  
• Most firms (28) use exchange rate options at 
least on an occasional basis, in particular to 
hedge uncertain / estimated future cash 
flows. Maturities are strongly concentrated in 
the segment up to 12 months.  
• Swaps are also used by a majority (22) of 
firms, mainly to hedge longer-term regular 
transactions, in many cases cash flows arising 
from debt financing, but also long-term 
delivery contracts, e.g. in the energy sector. 
Maturities can be substantially longer than 
for the other instruments, in some cases well 
beyond 10 years.  
The findings on the relative importance of the 
different instruments are broadly in line with the 
surveys in Bodnar et al (2003). The maturity 
distribution reported by the blue chips roughly 
corresponds to that of outstanding OTC 
derivatives reported by the BIS (Table 4).  
Graph  26: Notional amount of exchange rate 
derivatives (non-financial firms included in the  
EuroStoxx50 –  in % of 2006 revenue)  
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Source: Annual reports and financial statements, own calculations. 
In many firms, derivative hedging is a 
responsibility of the central treasury, where 
exposures arising from all activities and locations 
are netted out before the residual is hedged. 
There is relatively little information on the 
strategy with respect to the coverage of 
exposures. The firms that do provide details 
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generally hedge 100% of committed transactions 
and 75%-80% of anticipated transactions. A 
number of firms state that they use exchange rate 
derivatives exclusively for hedging purposes, not 
for speculation. Some firms explicitly take 
positions, while a majority is silent on this issue.  
Some firms report limitations to their hedging 
strategy arising from market structures. For 
example, the local debt market may be too 
shallow to contract sufficient amounts of debt to 
provide a natural hedge to the translation risk 
arising from a foreign subsidiary. Two firms 
report that the interest rate differential between 
euro-denominated debt and debt denominated in 
Brazilian real is too large to allow hedging 
through cross-currency swaps. In such cases, 
firms sometimes resort to hedging in a proxy 
currency that is strongly correlated to the target 
currency (e.g. exposure to currencies that are 
pegged to the US dollar is often hedged with 
dollar-denominated derivatives). Others limit 
their coverage to insurance against extreme 
exchange rate moves.  
Out of the 33 firms analysed, 22 refer to natural 
hedges. However, this issue is not systematically 
covered in Annual Reports and financial 
statements, so the share of firms actually using 
natural hedges might be higher. In most cases, 
firms report matching foreign assets with foreign 
liabilities and foreign revenues with payables in 
foreign currency. For example, foreign 
subsidiaries are financed with local debt or inter-
company loans denominated in their functional 
currency to offset translation risk. Similarly, 
foreign subsidiaries try to match the currency 
denomination of their costs and revenues. In 
itself, a network of foreign subsidiaries with 
exposures to a variety of currencies provides a 
certain diversification of exchange rate risk, and 
thus reduces the sensitivity to movements in a 
particular exchange rate pair.  
While all but one firm hedge transaction risk, 
most are not explicit about their approach to 
translation risk. Eight firms report systematically 
hedging it, two do so occasionally, and four state 
that they do not hedge translation risk.  
Operational hedging and hedging through 
foreign currency loans is almost by definition the 
domain of large multinational companies that 
have the capacity to relocate, to tap international 
financial markets and dispose of internationally 
accepted collateral. Real and financial 
globalisation is increasing these hedging 
possibilities with more widespread relocation of 
production and increased depth of local financial 
markets. What is more, the use of financial 
hedges is also positively related to firm size, 
probably due to fix costs for setting up a hedging 
function.  
The EuroStoxx50 companies surveyed here are 
not representative for the larger group of euro 
area exporters. Smaller, less diversified exporting 
firms may find it harder to manage their 
exchange rate risk than large multinationals. 
However, recent financial market developments 
and technological advances (IT, risk management 
techniques) have made the use of derivatives for 
hedging less costly and their design easier, and 
the use of financial hedges by smaller firms 
seems to be increasing. 
Hedging may have reduced the 
responsiveness of the trade account to the 
exchange rate 
The survey presented in this section and the 
literature on hedging concur in the observation 
that hedging of exchange rate risk has increased 
substantially in the euro area in the past decade, 
and that hedging instruments have become more 
easily available also for medium-sized firms. This 
increased use of hedging can be expected to have 
macroeconomic implications. The IMF argues in 
its April 2008 World Economic Outlook that the 
increased use of hedging may have led to longer 
lags in the adjustment of trade flows to exchange 
rate variations. 
It would seem that hedging permitted euro-area 
exporters to defend market shares during the 
episode of euro appreciation. In the words of 
Alan Greenspan: 'Gains from increased currency 
hedging against the dollar since early 2004 may have 
enabled European exporters to tolerate a fall in operating 
profit margins beyond what they otherwise would have 
been able to tolerate.'39  
                                                     
39 Greenspan, A. (2005), Current account, 'Remarks at 
advancing enterprise conference', London, February 4, 
2005.  
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However, to the extent that financial hedging 
instruments mature and have to be replaced 
under less advantageous conditions, the 
protection from financial hedging becomes 
weaker the longer the episode of appreciation 
lasts. In other words, even if the euro's real 
effective exchange rate were to remain 
unchanged going forward, further adjustment of 
trade to the euro strength is likely to still be in 
the pipeline. 
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Focus 
II. Income inequality and wage share: Patterns and determinants. 
This focus section describes long-run patterns in income inequality and labour income shares and discusses the determinants of 
distribution of income as well as their relationship with wage inequality and the unemployment rate. Income inequality in 
advanced economies followed a common downward trend until the 1970s and has tended to increase since, although with 
varying patterns across countries in terms of both magnitude and timing. This lack of a common pattern does not hold for top 
incomes, whose share has increased in almost all countries. Empirical evidence suggests that global trends, such as skill-biased 
technological progress, may have played a role in driving inequality over time, particularly regarding top incomes. However, the 
fact that wage and income inequality have shown marked country-specific patterns in recent years indicates that explanations 
based on common shocks can only account for part of the recent trends observed. In addition, changes in labour market 
institutions and in redistributive policies (through taxes and benefits) as well as their interaction with common shocks seem to 
have played a major role. This focus section also discusses developments in the wage share and warns against interpreting 
changes in wages as changes in income inequality. The relationship between income inequality and the wage share is complex. 
For instance, a fall in the labour income share may not be accompanied by a significant increase in income inequality if it 
comes with a lower unemployment rate, a less dispersed wage distribution and is offset by redistributive policies. There is some 
indication that, in some euro-area countries, the reduction in the labour share over the past two decades has been more 
pronounced than the increase in the inequality of disposable incomes. 
Concern about rising income inequality in many 
advanced economies over the last two decades 
has triggered extensive research on the patterns 
and causes of income inequality. This article 
intends to contribute to the debate by reviewing 
developments in the main inequality concepts 
and the likely drivers of the changes observed in 
the distribution of income. Particular attention is 
paid to the wage share – a concept widely 
followed in the policy debate – and its relation 
with other measures of income inequality.  
1.  Income inequality patterns 
Inequality patterns across countries 
This section presents a cross-national 
comparison of income inequality indicators (see 
Box 4).40 Graph 27 illustrates an unambiguous 
pattern of income inequality in the euro area.41 
Southern European countries and Ireland show 
                                                     
40 Figures are from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which 
provides an internationally comparable dataset on 
household incomes, their demographic characteristics and 
the labour market status of the main earners. 
41  Countries are separated into high- and middle-income 
economies according to per-capita gross national income 
in 2004. Middle-income economies are those with a gross 
national income of more than $826 but less than $10065; 
high-income economies are those with a gross national 
income of $10066 or more.  
the highest levels of inequality, Finland the 
lowest; continental euro-area countries are 
between the two.42  
Graph 28 compares Gini indices on market 
income (i.e. before taxes and benefits) and 
disposable incomes, the difference showing the 
impact of monetary redistribution through taxes 
and benefits. Several findings are noteworthy. 
First, disposable incomes are more evenly 
distributed than market incomes, as taxes and 
benefits narrow the overall distribution. Second, 
cross-country variation in inequality is wider after 
redistribution, as not all euro-area countries are 
equally successful in reducing market inequality. 
Third, nations that redistribute the most are not 
necessarily those with the greatest degree of 
market income inequality; the reduction in the 
Gini index due to redistribution is at its highest 
in Finland and Austria and at its lowest in 
Portugal and Italy. This picture does not change 
when the sample is extended to the EU-15, with 
Nordic and southern Mediterranean countries at 
the two extremes of the ranking. Fourth, the 
reductions are consistent with the patterns of 
aggregated public expenditure. However, large 
                                                     
42  This basic pattern is confirmed by the analysis of Lorenz 
dominance. The decile ratio leads to different orders, but 
the differences are small. See Brandolini, A. and T.M. 
Smeeding (2007), 'Inequality patterns in Western-type 
democracies: Cross-country differences and time 
changes,' CHILD, WP No 08/2007. 
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dispersion along the curve indicates that there are 
probably large country differences in the 
effectiveness of spending in correcting inequality 
(Graph 29). 
The impact of government action on income 
distribution may be direct or indirect. The level 
of taxation and its progressivity is the most direct 
factor. The tax system influences the retirement 
age and individual effort, with direct impact on 
income distribution. Tax policies subsidising 
education, health and training will indirectly have 
some impact over time on income distribution. 
Inequality dynamics, over the life cycle of 
individuals and from an intergenerational 
perspective, are crucial. This is why education 
and health systems are such important factors 
when it comes to fighting persistent inequalities. 
On the expenditure side, any support for poorer 
individuals, including benefits in kind, has a 
direct effect on income distribution. Indirect 
effects may operate through means that improve 
job opportunities for the less well-off (e.g. 
education or on the job training), keep people 
healthy and improve their chances of being in the 
labour force. 
Graph 27: Income inequality: Gini Index on household-equivalent disposable income 
Most recent data for each country, late 1990s/early 2000s 
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Data source: Brandolini and Smeeding (2007). Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study database. 
 
 
 
Graph 28: Impact of public redistribution on income 
inequality: Gini Indices 
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Source: Immervoll, G., H. Levy, C. Lietz, D. Manotvani, C. 
O’Donoghue, H. Sutherland and G. Verbist, (2005), 'Household 
Incomes and Redistribution in the European Union: Quantifying 
the Equalising Properties of Taxes and Benefits', IZA Discussion 
Papers 1824. Gini indices are computed on the basis of micro-
simulations of income levels rather than on records of original 
micro-data as in Brandolini and Smeeding (used in Graph 29). 
Graph 29: Public redistribution and public 
expenditure: 1998 
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Source: Immervoll et al (2005).  
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Box 4: Measures of income inequality 
 
A widely used indicator is the income share per decile, with the share of the poorest (10th percentile) and the richest 
decile (90th percentile) capturing inequality at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution. The decile ratio, 
P90/P10, equals one in the case of perfect equality and tends to infinity as less income accrues to the bottom 10th of 
the population, and more to the top 10th. The top percentile income share divided by the income share of the next 
nine percentiles in the top decile gives a picture of the inequality at the very top of the distribution. 
The Lorenz curve describes the entire income distribution, plotting the income share of the bottom x percent of the 
population against the population share. The Gini index is the ratio of the area under the Lorenz curve and the area 
under the perfect equality line (i.e. the total triangle below the 45-degree line). Accordingly, it varies between 0 
(maximum equality) and 1 (maximum inequality).  
The ranking of countries depends on which part of the distribution is analysed. Thus, different measures may lead to 
different rankings, as they weight the top and the bottom of the distribution differently. For example, the Gini index 
gives less weight to the very rich and the very poor. Accordingly, it is less sensitive to measurement problems at the 
extremes of the income distribution. However, its biggest problem is that different distributions can lead to the same 
value of the index. A robust ranking is provided by comparing the Lorenz curve across countries. Thus, income is 
distributed less unequally in country A than in country B if the Lorenz curve of A always lies above, i.e. it "Lorenz" 
dominates that of B.  
Money income can refer to market, gross (or total) or disposable income. Market income comprises labour, capital 
income or self-employment income. Gross income adds to market income all transfers received by the household, 
such as unemployment compensation, welfare benefits, public and private pensions, child and family allowances. 
Disposable income is equal to gross income minus direct income taxes and social security contributions.  
 
Indicators can look at household, household equivalent and person. In order to account for the economies of scale 
stemming from cohabitation, household equivalent measures are preferable. Changes in the labour market status of 
family composition may influence income inequality even without changes in individual wages. For example, Esping-
Andersen (2004)* argues that most of the rising trend in household income inequality is due to the increase in female 
participation and to the reduction in youth participation. 
*Esping-Andersen, G (2004), 'Income distribution and life chance opportunities', in A. Giddens (ed.), 'The New egalitarism: 
opportunity and prosperity in modern society'. 
Time changes in income inequality 
Analysis of inequality is fraught with data 
problems, which make cross-country 
comparison of changes over time difficult. Even 
so, empirical evidence has generated a number 
of stylised facts (Graph 33). First, from a secular 
perspective, the common decline in inequality in 
the earlier part of the 20th century ceased in the 
1970s. Second, in many countries the increase in 
inequality over the past three decades has been 
larger in terms of market income. Inequality in 
terms of market income displays a rather 
uniform picture across countries, increasing in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, but very stable 
afterwards (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007). 
Inequality of disposable income decreased until 
the mid-1970s, followed by a more country-
specific pattern thereafter. It rose sharply in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s and in the United 
States in the 1980s and 1990s, and more 
modestly in Finland, West Germany, Sweden 
and Canada in the 1990s. By contrast, it 
stabilised during the 1990s in the Netherlands, 
France and Italy.43 The different behaviour of 
income inequality in terms of market and 
disposable incomes reflects the equalising effect 
of redistributive policies. 
The lack of an international common pattern in 
overall income inequality does not concern the 
upper tail of the distribution. Graph 30 displays 
the income shares earned by the richest.44 Apart 
from clearly showing the impact of the 
                                                     
43 Estimates based on Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth show that the inequality of disposable income 
rose sharply in Italy between 1991 and 1993 but not 
thereafter, which is surprising given the fundamental 
transformation that occurred in the labour market. See 
Boeri, T. and A. Brandolini (2005) 'The age of 
discontent: Italian households at the beginning of the 
decade', Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 
Vol.63 (3-4), pp. 449-487.  
44  These series are constructed by several researchers as 
parts of a joint effort where the main source is the 
income statements in personal tax returns collected for 
different income classes (Roine et al., 2007). 
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depression and World War II for many 
countries, a striking feature is the remarkably 
similar development of top income shares across 
countries over time. In times when a country has 
grown faster than the average, top income 
earners have benefited more than proportionally 
(Piketty, 2003; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007).45 
This result does not depend on the stage of 
development and is consistent across countries.  
Besides income inequality, there has been much 
concern about rising wage inequality. OECD 
(2007a)46 decomposes the overall change in wage 
inequality in 10 OECD countries since 1980 into 
the contributions of wage dispersion in the 
upper and lower halves of the wage distribution. 
With the exception of France and Finland, wage 
inequality has increased since the 1980s, with 
most of the increase stemming from increased 
inequality in the top half of the wage 
distribution. 
2.  Determinants of income inequality  
An important distinction should be made 
between the drivers of overall inequality and 
those at the upper tail of the distribution.  
Determinants of overall income inequality 
The Kuznets hypothesis contends that income 
inequality widens at the early phase of economic 
growth and narrows in the later stages of 
development. As an economy goes through 
structural change (i.e. resources are transferred 
from low- to high-productivity sectors), 
inequality follows an inverse U-shape. Recent 
work has considered variables other than the 
level of income, such as the degree of 
democratisation and financial development, or 
the extent of dualism in the labour markets. 
                                                     
45 Piketty, T. (2003) 'Income inequality in France, 1901-
1998', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No 5, pp. 
1004-1042 
 Atkinson, T. and T. Piketty, (2007), 'Top incomes over 
the Twentieth Century: a contrast between continental 
European and English-speaking countries', Oxford 
University Press. 
46 OECD (2007a), 'OECD Workers in the Global 
Economy: Increasingly Vulnerable', OECD Employment 
Outlook, 2007. 
Political scientists (e.g. Reuveny and Li, 2003)47 
advance the idea that democracy promotes 
egalitarianism, due to its use of redistributive 
policies. As regards the impact of financial 
development, theory predicts that it should 
decrease inequality, as it facilitates access to 
capital of previously credit-constrained 
individuals (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993).48 The 
empirical evidence shows that more democratic 
countries, better law enforcement, and greater 
financial development are associated with a more 
equal distribution of income while segmented 
labour markets are associated with greater 
inequality (e.g. Barro, 2000, Bourguignon and 
Morrison, 1998).49 
Determinants of overall income inequality in 
small samples of mature economies 
Economic structure, political variables and the 
level of financial development show little 
variability across OECD countries, and are thus 
ineffective in explaining inequality in developed 
economies. A first strand of the literature has 
explored the relationship between inequality and 
growth (e.g. Aghion et al., 1999; Bertola et al., 
2006; García-Peñalosa, 2007).50 
This literature argues that the growth process is 
the result of a combination of technological 
change, accumulation of physical and human 
capital and changes in labour supply, each of 
them representing a channel through which 
inequality and growth are related. However, the 
                                                     
47 Reuveny, R. and Q. Li (2003), 'Economic openness, 
democracy and income inequality: and empirical analysis', 
Comparative Political Studies 36 (5), 575-601. 
48 Galor, O. and J. Zeira (1993), 'Income Distribution and 
Macroeconomics', Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.  
49 Barro, R.J. (2000), 'Inequality and growth in a panel of 
countries', Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, pp. 5-32. 
 Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrison (1998), 'Inequality and 
development: The role of dualism', Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 57, pp. 233-257. 
50 Aghion, P., E. Caroli and C. García-Peñalosa (1999), 
'Inequality and growth in the new growth theories', 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 1615-1669. 
 Bertola, G, R. Foellmi, and J Zweimüller (2006). 'Income 
distribution in macroeconomic models', Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
 Garcia-Peñalosa, C. (2007), 'The economics of 
distribution and growth. Recent issues', mimeo, 4th annual 
DG ECFIN research conference. 
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outcome of this literature is that 'anything goes': 
distribution can widen or narrow during the 
growth process and growth of itself cannot be 
expected to reduce inequality of incomes.  
The poor predictive capacity of growth theory 
has prompted vast research to shed light on 
inequality patterns within rich countries. The 
literature has focused on the effect of skill-
biased technological change (SBTC), 
globalisation, labour market institutions (LMIs) 
and economic integration. 
Technological developments have increased the 
relative demand for skilled workers, pushing up 
their wage relative to that of unskilled workers,  
thereby worsening the distribution of wage 
earnings and increasing income inequality. 
However, the difference across countries in the 
patterns of wage inequality is inconsistent with a 
single explanatory factor. In particular, LMIs 
may have brought about bigger changes in the 
wage premium of high-skill workers than were 
warranted by changes in supply and demand. 
For instance, the decline of the unions and the 
erosion of the real value of the minimum wage 
in the US in the 1980s may have increased the 
wage premium by more than was justified by 
market factors alone.  
Theory has yielded a number of predictions 
about the effects of globalisation on inequality, 
with various channels, including trade, 
offshoring of intermediate inputs, immigration 
and the transformation of the welfare state. The 
neo-classical trade theory predicts that countries 
relatively more endowed with capital and skilled 
labour should specialise in capital and skill-
intensive products. In addition, low-skilled 
labour can be accessed by advanced economies 
by off-shoring of intermediate inputs and 
through immigration. Hence, the wages of the 
low-skilled come under pressure as countries 
specialise and the distribution of earnings in 
developed countries worsens. However, it is not 
obvious why such globalisation forces should 
cause an increased dispersion in the upper half 
of the wage distribution, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
On the relationship between globalisation and 
the welfare state there are two competing 
perspectives. The first is that globalisation 
increases capital mobility and shifts taxes on 
labour, thereby weakening the capacity of the 
State to redistribute (e.g. Tanzi, 1995; Blank and 
Freeman, 1994).51 An opposing view contends 
that social policies respond in ways that 
minimise the adverse consequences of 
globalisation for vulnerable workers (e.g. Rodrik 
1998).52 
The evidence on the effect of globalisation on 
inequality is inconclusive. On the one hand, 
heightened import competition and increased 
offshoring had little (if any) effect on aggregate 
employment; on the other hand, it reduced the 
demand for low-skilled relative to high-skilled 
workers, thereby increasing wage dispersion. 
However, it is difficult to disentangle the effects 
of globalisation from other factors, such as 
structural reforms and technological change. The 
immigration literature shows negligible impact of 
increased immigration on domestic workers, but 
rather a big downward impact on foreign-born 
workers who specialise in particular occupations 
dominated by immigrants. 53 
However, it is hard to explain the changes in 
inequality only on the basis of common factors. 
The lack of common developments in inequality 
in recent years suggests that country-specific 
features such as changes in LMIs more than 
common trends play a role in driving inequality 
over time (e.g. for the US, Levy and Temin, 
2007; for Europe, Checchi and García-Peñalosa 
2008).54  
                                                     
51 Tanzi, V. (1995), 'Taxation in an Integrating World', 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
 Blank, R.M. and R.B. Freeman (1994), 'Evaluating the 
connection between social protection and economic 
flexibility', in R. M. Blank, ed., 'Social Protection versus 
Economic Flexibility', The University of Chicago Press. 
52 Rodrik, D. (1998), 'Why do more open economies have 
bigger governments?', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, 
pp. 997-1032. 
53  See 'The economic impact of migration' focus section of 
'Labour Market and wage developments in 2007', ECFIN 
(2008). 
54 Levy, F. and P. Temin (2007), 'Inequality and institutions 
in 20th century America', NBER Working Paper No 
13106. 
Chechi, D. and C. García-Peñalosa (2008), 'Labour market 
institutions and income inequality', forthcoming in 
Economic Policy.  
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Levy and Temin (2007) argue that income 
distribution in the US before and after the 1980s 
was strongly shaped by LMIs. The early post-
war years of the 20th century were dominated by 
unions, progressive taxes, and high minimum 
wages, whereas more recent years have seen a 
reversal in these dimensions and a widening of 
income inequality. Gordon and Dew-Becker 
(2008)55 show that movements in the P50/P10 
ratio in the US are consistent with decreased 
union density and lower real minimum wage 
during the period 1979-1986. Technological and 
trade development would have amplified the 
effect of less rigid LMIs. However, the 
contribution of more flexible LMIs to the 
increase in wage inequality declines when the 
skill structure of the labour force is taken into 
account.  
Checchi and Garcia (2008) assess the links 
between LMIs, labour market outcomes (i.e. 
                                                                             
 One could argue that institutional changes, most notably 
changes in LMIs, are a response to globalisation. 
However, Levy and Temin (2007) strongly dispute this 
for the US and claim that globalisation clearly does not 
determine institutions. 
55  Dew-Becker, I. and R.J. Gordon (2008), 'Controversies 
about the Rise of American Inequality: A Survey', NBER 
Working Papers 13982, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. 
unemployment rate, wage dispersion and labour 
share) and income inequality.56 The impact of 
LMIs on income inequality is a priori 
ambiguous, as stronger LMIs result in i) higher 
unemployment rates, which increase inequality; 
ii) less wage dispersion, which reduces inequality; 
and iii) higher labour share, with an ambiguous 
effect on inequality.  
However, their econometric analysis suggests 
that, with the exception of the tax wedge, LMIs 
engender a trade-off between inequality and 
unemployment. Essentially this implies that the 
reduction in inequality brought about by a 
compressed wage distribution more than offsets 
the increase in inequality induced by the higher 
unemployment rates that tend to accompany 
stronger LMIs.57 Interestingly, two clusters of 
institutions are identified: wage-setting and 
employment security institutions. Wage-setting 
institutions (stronger in the Nordic countries) 
                                                     
56  The following LMIs are considered: EPL, the tax wedge, 
the minimum wage, the unemployment benefit, union 
density and coverage and the degree of 
centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining. 
57  Burniaux et al. (2006) find that stronger unions are 
associated with lower income inequality, especially at the 
lower end of the income distribution. See Burniaux, J.M., 
F. Padrini and N. Brandt (2006) 'Labour market 
performance, income inequality and poverty in OECD 
countries', OECD Working Paper, No 500. 
Graph 30: Top income percentile for 16 countries over the twentieth century 
 
 
 
Source: Roine et al. (2007). 
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seem to be more effective at reducing inequality 
than employment security institutions (stronger in 
continental Europe), the reason being that the 
former have a weaker negative effect on 
unemployment than the latter. Anglo-Saxon 
countries exhibit the weakest institutional set-up 
of any kind and the highest levels of income 
inequality. 
Few researchers have analysed the interactions 
between monetary integration and income 
inequality (e.g. Bertola, 2007).58 Within a 
monetary union, labour market features become 
even more crucial in shaping wage and 
unemployment developments, and thus income 
inequality. If nominal wages are rigid, foregoing 
devaluations may require sharper activity 
slowdowns and unemployment increases in 
order to restore competitiveness. Monetary 
integration requires enhanced wage and 
employment flexibility in response to sectoral or 
regional shocks.  It also requires well-developed 
financial markets to allow households to hedge 
more easily against risks related to cyclical 
fluctuations in income.  
Finally, monetary integration has an impact on 
the ability of governments to redistribute. On 
the one hand, new sources of risk increase the 
appeal of policies meant to buffer the welfare 
implications of uninsurable risk, and may explain 
why more open countries’ governments are 
more deeply involved in economic and social 
issues. On the other hand, international 
integration affects the viability of national 
redistribution, as it is more difficult for these 
policies to shape individual choices differently 
from what would be implied by market 
mechanisms. Depending on whether demand or 
supply influences dominate, integration may in 
practice increase or decrease the intensity of 
redistribution.  
With a number of caveats, notably the 
comparability of the datasets, the evidence 
suggests that global trends, such as skill-biased 
technological progress, may have played a role in 
driving inequality over time. However, country-
specific patterns in wage inequality have tended 
to prevail in recent years, making an explanation 
                                                     
58 Bertola, G. (2007) 'Economic integration, growth, 
distribution: does the euro make a difference?', mimeo, 4th 
annual DG ECFIN research conference. 
based on common shocks implausible. Indeed, 
the evidence suggests that LMIs may explain 
most of the change in wage inequality over time 
across countries.  
Determinants of top income shares 
The empirical evidence suggests that economic 
growth disproportionately benefits the top 
percentile (e.g. Roine et al., 200759). Similarly, 
inequality at the top of the income scale rises as 
financial development proceeds, particularly at 
the early stages of economic development (i.e. 
emerging economies). Openness to trade has no 
clear distributional impact. If anything, openness 
reduces top income shares. Tax progressivity 
significantly reduces top income shares, whereas 
the size of government spending has no clear 
impact on the rich, as it seems to have been 
neutral for the top but negative for the next nine 
percentiles. It is significantly positive for the 
nine lowest deciles. 
Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) find evidence 
for the US that skill-biased technical change is a 
major determinant of labour incomes at the 
upper part of income distribution, together with 
the fact that jobs at the top cannot be 
outsourced. Arbitrary managerial power also lies 
behind some of the outsized gains in top 
executives pay, along with stock options, which 
have created an automatic spillover from the 
stock market gains of the 1990s directly into 
executives' remuneration.  
3.  The labour income share: patterns 
and determinants 
Labour income share patterns 
There is no common trend across euro-area 
countries in the development of the labour share 
(Graph 31).60 Sharp declines in labour shares are 
                                                     
59 Roine, J., J. Vlachos and D. Waldenström, (2007), 'What 
Determines Top Income Shares? Evidence from the 
Twentieth Century', Research Papers in Economics 2007:17, 
Stockholm University, Department of Economics. 
60  The labour share is defined as the ratio between average 
wages and average labour productivity.  The labour share 
is computed by attributing to the self-employed the 
compensation of the average employee of their own 
activity branch, then adding across all sectors in the 
economy.  
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displayed in Austria, Finland and Ireland. 
Moderate (though persistent) reductions are 
observed in France and Italy, whereas Germany 
and Spain have registered mild downward 
movements. In the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, labour shares declined until the 
mid-1980s and broadly stabilised afterwards. The 
opposite applies to Belgium, Greece and 
Portugal, where labour shares increased until the 
mid-1980s, thereafter stabilising or declining. 
Outside EMU, labour share swings around a 
stable long-run value are found in Denmark and 
the UK, while a downward trend is observed for 
Sweden. 
Labour income share: the role of 
compositional effects 
Movements in the aggregate labour share 
conceal important sectoral developments. 
Overall changes in the labour share can be 
decomposed into changes in the sectoral 
composition of the economy, in the composition 
of employment (i.e. as employees or self-
employed), and in the share of employees' 
remuneration in value added. The latter provides 
an indication of episodes of wage moderation or 
acceleration.  
Graph 32 depicts a shift-share decomposition of 
the labour share using sectoral data from the 
EU KLEMS database covering the period 1970-
2004.61 The analysis is performed for three sub-
periods, namely 1970-1985, 1986-1995 and 
1996-2004. In spite of the complexity and 
disparity of labour share movements across 
countries, some common patterns can be 
identified: i) Over the whole period 1970-2004, 
sectoral and employment composition effects 
have generally contributed to a reduction in the 
aggregate labour share; and ii) during the sub-
periods 1970-1985 and 1996-2004 changes in the 
share of employees' remuneration in value added 
within each sector account for a large proportion 
                                                     
61  For details, see box 'Long-term trends in the labour 
share' in DG ECFIN (2008) 'Labour market and wage 
developments in 2007'; 24 sectors grouped into 9 broadly 
defined industries are included: 'Agriculture', 'Mining and 
quarrying', 'Manufacturing', 'Electricity, gas and water 
supply', 'Construction', 'Wholesale and retail trade', 
'Hotels and restaurants', 'Transport and storage and 
communication', 'Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services'.  
of the changes in the aggregate labour share. 
Whether this latter effect has contributed to a 
downward rather than an upward movement in 
the aggregate labour share depends on the 
country.  
This analysis illustrates that it is generally 
incorrect to interpret movements in the labour 
share as exclusively stemming from the share of 
employees' remuneration in value added. 
Declining labour shares do not necessarily reflect 
episodes of wage moderation. As illustrated by 
Graph 32, part of the decline in the labour share 
in many countries is due to compositional effects 
arising from sectoral changes or from changes in 
the structure of employment, with an increasing 
weight of sectors with lower labour shares 
together with a widespread reduction in the 
proportion of self-employment in total 
employment.62 Hence, since the sources of 
declining labour shares, where they occurred, are 
partly structural, wage-setting policies alone will 
not be sufficient to reverse the downward trend 
observed in some countries. 
A theoretical framework to account for 
labour share movements in the medium run 
Early models tried to explain changes in the 
wage share in terms of underlying changes in 
relative factor prices. These models proved 
useful to account for labour share movements in 
the 1970s (box 5). An increase in relative wages 
starting in the 1970s led initially to an increase in 
the labour share but did not have much effect 
on employment. As firms started substituting 
away from labour, the labour share started to 
fall, and unemployment to rise. Even so, it is 
argued that the decrease in the labour share since 
the mid-1980s has not been associated with a 
consistent increase in employment and it seems 
unlikely that this development can be explained 
by long lags or by the costs of adjusting factor 
proportions. 
                                                     
62 A widespread reduction in the share of self-employed will 
translate into a lower aggregate labour share, as it implies 
that a lower level of compensation per employee is 
attributed to a given number of employed.  
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A second set of contributions (e.g. Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2003)63 has analysed variations in 
the labour share in rent-sharing models: product 
market imperfections generate rents that are split 
between firms and unions. Seen in this light, 
downward movements in the labour share derive 
from a rise in rents accruing to firms owing to 
rising imperfection in the goods markets, which 
raises the price level and eventually reduces real 
wages, or to unions' weaker bargaining power. 
This incorporates the effect on the labour share 
brought about by product market regulation, 
which sets the entry costs and the degree of 
competition between firms, and by labour 
market regulations, which influence the unions' 
bargaining power. 
In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), labour market 
deregulation is held responsible for the decline 
in the labour share in continental Europe. 
However, this decline is seen as temporary; in 
the long-run enhanced product market 
deregulation should spur employment and the 
labour share should recover. 
                                                     
63 Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi, (2003) 'Macroeconomic 
effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and 
labour markets', The quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
118(3), pp. 879-907. 
In much the same way as in the literature on the 
determinants of income inequality, a large 
number of empirical studies have sought to link 
movements in the labour share to SBTC and 
globalisation. Ellis and Smith (2007) claim that, 
by increasing the rate of obsolescence of capital 
goods, ongoing technological progress has put 
firms in a stronger bargaining position relative to 
a labour force that now faces more frequent job 
losses on average. This effect is stronger where 
labour market institutions are more rigid.64 
There are several reasons why globalisation may 
adversely impact on the labour share (e.g. 
Rodrik, 1997,65 Harrison, 200266). As the 
economy becomes more open to trade, capital-
rich countries specialise in the production of 
capital-intensive goods and import labour-
intensive goods. Accordingly, in developed 
countries the returns to labour and the labour 
share will decline, especially for the relatively  
                                                     
64 Ellis, L. and K. Smith, (2007), 'The global upward trend 
in the profit share', BIS Working Papers 231. 
65 Rodrik, D. (1997), 'Has Globalisation gone too far?', 
Institute for International Economics. 
66 Harrison, A.E. (2002), 'Has globalisation eroded labor's 
share? Some cross-country evidence', mimeo. 
Box 5: The wage share and factor prices 
 
The share of labour income flowing to wages is a function of the quantity and prices of the factors of production. If
factors are paid according to their marginal productivity, the long-run distribution of total output hinges on the degree
to which one input can be substituted with another to equalise marginal gains (i.e. on the elasticity of substitution).
For instance, if capital and labour are close substitutes, an increase in the relative price of labour implies a more than
proportional fall in employment and a fall in the wage share. 
If the elasticity of substitution equals 1 (i.e. a Cobb-Douglas production function), any increase in the supply of
labour (relative to capital) would be accompanied by a proportionate change in its relative price, leaving factor shares
unchanged (i.e. constant over time).  
On the other hand, assuming an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour other than 1 explains medium-
run movements in factor shares in response to changes in relative factor prices and labour-augmenting technical
progress. In fact, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function combined with the assumption of
labour-augmenting technical progress can explain movements in factor shares jointly with their long-run stability.
With a CES production function, the labour share will decrease (increase) in the capital-output ratio if the elasticity of
substitution of capital and labour is above (below) 1. 
Thus, the labour share depends on the capital-labour ratio (i.e. on how capital-intensive production is), with a sign
that depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Technological and institutional variables
shift the relationship between the wage share and the capital-labour ratio (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003).*  
(*) Bentolila, S. and G. Saint-Paul (2003), 'Explaining movements in the labor share', Contributions to Macroeconomics, Vol. 3(1),
pp. 1103-1103. 
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scarce unskilled labour.67 Globalisation also 
makes capital more mobile, putting pressure on 
labour, the less mobile factor. Finally, some have 
argued that globalisation pressures might have 
pushed industrial countries to adopt labour-
saving technologies, further squeezing the labour 
share. The European Commission (2007)68 and 
the IMF (2007)69 have shown that globalisation 
                                                     
67  In terms of welfare, however, workers in advanced 
economies could still be better off if the positive effects 
from enhanced trade and productivity on the economy’s 
income (the size of the total 'pie') are larger than the 
negative effect on the share of this income that accrues 
to labour. 
68  European Commission (2007), 'The Labour Income Share in 
the European Union', Employment in Europe, 2007. 
69  IMF (2007), 'The Globalization of Labor', World Economic 
Outlook., April 2007. 
may have reduced the share of income accruing 
to labour in advanced economies, but its effect is 
small. Indeed, the largest contribution to the fall 
in the aggregate labour share derives from the 
SBTC. The IMF analysis also finds that 
countries that have enacted reforms to lower the 
cost of labour to business and improve labour 
market flexibility have generally experienced a 
smaller decline in the labour share. 
All in all, the labour share may be influenced by 
both demand and supply factors. The literature 
briefly reviewed in this focus section suggests 
that factors related to production technology are 
potentially important determinants of changes in 
the labour share. However, more competitive 
markets or changes in the supply of specific 
skills may also be a source of labour share 
movements.  
Graph 31: Labour share, EU15 Member States 
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Graph 32: Sources of changes (AVG) in the labour share (EU15), 
non-market services excluded  
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4.  The relationship between income 
inequality, wage inequality and the 
labour income share 
Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008) present a 
unifying framework to analyse developments in 
income inequality and its relationship with wage 
dispersion and the labour share. Income 
inequality is measured by the Gini index 
computed across four groups of population, 
namely unemployed, unskilled, skilled workers 
and skilled people earning both income from 
labour and from capital. Inequality depends on 
population proportions, the replacement rate, 
wage dispersion and the labour share. A higher 
rate of unemployment will raise income 
inequality, as the fraction of individuals with low 
incomes will increase. A more dispersed wage 
distribution raises the Gini coefficient, as it 
increases inequality between different groups of 
employed individuals (e.g. skilled and unskilled). 
More ambiguous is the effect of the wage share. 
On the one hand, a higher labour share implies 
lower inequality between capital and non-capital 
owners. On the other hand, a higher labour 
share increases the income differential between 
employed and unemployed individuals, raising 
inequality within the group of non-capital 
owners.  
However, the evidence provided suggests that 
the effect of inequality between capital owners 
and non-capital owners is greater than the 
inequality within groups (employed versus 
unemployed workers). Thus, a lower labour 
share raises income inequality. 
One question is how developments in the 
unemployment rate, the wage differential and 
the labour share can account for the income 
inequality patterns observed over the past 
decades in euro-area countries. During the last 
decade, euro-area countries have experienced a 
gradual reduction in their unemployment rates, 
which may have partially offset the increase in 
income inequality caused by a falling labour 
share (in almost all euro-area countries) and 
increasing wage dispersion (in some of them). 
The fact that in some countries the reduction in 
the labour share has been pronounced while the 
increase in income inequality measured in terms 
of disposable income has been much less so 
further suggests that redistribution through taxes 
and transfers has had a strong equalising effect. 
5.  Conclusion  
This focus section has presented evidence of 
income inequality and labour share patterns over 
time. The wage moderation of the last decade 
has been accompanied by a declining labour 
share, giving rise to distributional concerns. This 
pattern does not stem exclusively from wage 
moderation, but also from changes in the 
sectoral composition of the economy. 
Accordingly, wage policies alone will not be 
sufficient to reverse the trend in labour shares 
observed in some euro-area countries.  
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that 
the labour share is only a partial indicator of 
income inequality. Any exhaustive appraisal of 
inequality trends must take also account of 
changes in the distribution of wages and 
personal disposable income, which includes 
other sources of income besides earnings. For 
instance, persistent labour underutilisation 
increases inequality as it raises the proportion of 
people with low incomes.  
As regards the effect of skill-biased technological 
change on income inequality, it is often argued 
that one way of sharing the premium on skilled 
labour as evenly as possible is to raise the level 
of education. However, an increase in the skilled 
labour supply will endogenously lower the skill 
premium, inducing substitution between skilled 
and unskilled, thus depressing the labour share 
and leading to offsetting effects on income 
inequality.  
Beyond increases in spending on education and 
training, the quality of expenditure is crucial. The 
comparison of Gini Indices on market and 
disposable incomes reveals that public 
redistribution through taxes and transfers can 
have a strong equalising effect in mature 
economies. 
Regarding the role of labour market institutions 
as a source of equalisation, several insights are 
worth mentioning. On the one hand, with the 
exception of the tax wedge, which shows a 
positive correlation with the Gini coefficient, 
LMIs engender a trade-off between inequality 
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Graph 33: Gini index in selected countries  
West Germany France
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Germany: (1) equivalent disposable income of households; weighted by person; OECD equivalence scale; only German population. (2) 
equivalent market income of households; weighted by person; OECD equivalence scale; only German population. (3) equivalent disposable 
income of households, included imputed rent; weighted by person; modified OECD equivalence scale. France: (1) excluding non-taxable 
incomes; weighted by household. (2) excluding property income and some social benefits; weighted by household; OECD modified 
equivalence scale; only households with non-negative taxable income and positive disposable income. (3) excluding property income and some 
social benefits; weighted by person; OECD modified equivalence scale; only persons in households with nonnegative taxable income and 
positive disposable income. Italy: (1) excluding imputed rents, interest and dividends; weighted by household; figures for 1968-1972 estimated 
from grouped data. (2) excluding interest and dividends; weighted by household; figures for 1973-1975. (3) weighted by person; square root 
equivalence scale. United Kingdom (1a) gross income of tax units; (1b) disposable income of tax units; in both cases, weighted by tax unit; the 
first series is for incomes net of amounts spent on mortgage interest (old basis), while the second is for incomes gross of those amounts (new 
basis). (2a) market income; (2b) disposable income; in both cases, weighted by household; the first series refers to unadjusted incomes, the 
second series to equivalent income. Source: Brandolini and Smeeding (2007). 
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and unemployment. This implies that the 
redistributive role of LMIs other than the tax 
wedge, namely, EPL, the minimum wage, 
unemployment benefit, union density and 
coverage and the degree of 
centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining, 
is to increase the wage share at the bottom end 
of the distribution. It also means that the 
reduction in inequality brought about by a more 
compressed wage distribution more than offsets 
the increase in inequality brought on by the 
higher unemployment rates, usually associated 
with stronger LMIs. 
A caveat is, however, in order. Even if the 
predominant effect of LMIs is to reduce the 
wage dispersion, this does not need to translate 
 
 into reduced income inequality from the 
household perspective. For instance, minimum 
wages may be ineffective in narrowing income 
distribution when none of the members of poor 
families is employed. 
In any case, changes in the design of LMIs may 
improve the trade-off between inequality and 
unemployment and be welfare-enhancing. 
Policies that increase participation and reduce 
unemployment may contribute to reducing 
income inequality. Similarly, coordinated wage-
setting institutions are more effective at reducing 
inequality than employment protection 
institutions, as they tend to have a weaker 
negative effect on unemployment.  
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